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INTERPRETATION AND INSTITUTIONS 
Cass R. Sunstein* and A drian Vermeule** 
Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the 
introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes 
cancer" in human beings or animals. ' Suppose that new technolo­
gies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many 
potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is 
often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with 
governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, 
that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into 
food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging 
that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were 
applied, it would prove absurd and fail to promote the legislative 
purpose, which is to make food safer. In response, the government 
argues that the statute must be interpreted literally and that all ad­
ditives that "cause cancer" are banned. How should the court 
resolve the dispute? 
Such questions are pervasive. But we think that current 
theories of legal interpretation fail to provide an adequate frame­
work for thinking about them, and that the failure reveals a serious 
problem with contemporary claims about interpretation in law. 
Typically, interpretive issues are debated at a high level of abstrac­
tion, by asking questions about the nature of interpretation, or by 
making large claims about democracy, legitimacy, authority, and 
constitutionalism.2 But most of the time, large-scale claims of these 
kinds cannot rule out any reasonable view about interpretation. 
For example, it is impossible to deduce from such large-scale 
claims an answer to a dispute about the meaning of the phrase 
"cause cancer," or indeed an answer to any of the current ques-
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University 
of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. 
** Professor of Law, University of Chicago. - Ed. For valuable comments, we are 
grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Rick Pildes, Eric Posner, Richard Posner. Geoffrey Stone. 
David Weisbach, and workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School. 
1. This is a modest variation on an actual case. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 
F.2d 1 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
2. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1985) (emphasizing "integrity" as a princi­
ple of legitimacy): John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Stalllte, IOI 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36-52 (2001 ) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism) (emphasizing con­
stitutional ideals); Frank Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism. 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999) (invoking the idea of democracy). 
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tions about how to approach a statutory or constitutional text. Part 
of our goal here is to demonstrate the futility of efforts to show 
that abstract ideals can resolve disagreements about appropriate 
interpretive methods. 
By contrast, we urge that it is far more promising to focus on 
two neglected issues. The first has to do with institutional capaci­
ties. As we shall urge, debates over legal interpretation cannot be 
sensibly resolved without attention to those capacities. The central 
question is not "how, in principle, should a text be interpreted?" 
The question instead is "how should certain institutions, with their 
distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts?" If the 
relevant judges can reliably decide whether a literal interpretation 
of a statutory term is absurd, the argument for rejecting literalism 
is greatly strengthened; if the relevant judges are highly fallible, 
literalism may have some overlooked virtues. A great deal turns as 
well on the attentiveness of the relevant legislature; the appro­
priate stance toward interpretation is not the same in a system with 
an attentive legislative as in a system with an inattentive one. The 
second issue involves the dynamic effects of any particular ap­
proach - its consequences for private and public actors of various 
sorts. If a nonliteral interpretation of the phrase "induce cancer" 
would introduce a great deal of uncertainty into the system and 
reduce Congress's incentive to make corrections, it might well be 
sensible to deny exceptions in cases involving trivial risks. By 
drawing attention to both institutional capacities and dynamic ef­
fects, we are suggesting the need for a kind of institutional turn in 
thinking about interpretive issues. 
With an emphasis on institutional capacities and dynamic 
effects, we will be able to see that nearly all of the most prominent 
discussions of interpretation - including, for example, those by 
Jeremy Bentham, William Blackstone, H.L.A. Hart, Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks, Ronald Dworkin, William Eskridge, John 
Manning, and Richard Posner - are incomplete and unsuccessful, 
simply because they generally proceed as if the only question is 
how "we" should interpret a text. Where they attend to institu­
tional roles at all, these theorists frequently work with an ideal­
ized, even heroic picture of judicial capacities and, as a corollary, a 
jaundiced view of the capacities of other lawmakers and interpret­
ers, such as agencies and legislatures. And if the spotlight is placed 
on institutional capacities and dynamic effects, we will find it much 
easier to understand what underlies many interpretive disagree­
ments in law, and also to see how such disagreements might be 
resolved.3 
3. We deliberately paint here with a broad brush. Some of the authors mentioned 
are occasionally attentive to institutional issues; we discuss them in greater detail below. 
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Of course the Court is often aware of its institutional limita­
tions, especially but not exclusively in the constitutional domain. 
The high deference usually reflected in "rationality review" 
represents a recognition that courts might misunderstand the facts, 
and that when the facts are unclear, judgments of value should be 
made politically, not judieially.4 When the Court refused to subject 
racially discriminatory effects to heightened scrutiny, it relied in 
part on the institutional problems that would be created by that 
scrutiny.5 The Court's reluctance to use the nondelegation doctrine 
seems to be rooted, in part, in the institutional concern that courts 
could not draw sensible lines between permitted and prohibited 
delegations.6 The Court refused to forbid sex discrimination in 
registration for the draft, not by endorsing sex discrimination as 
such, but by urging that this was a context in which Congress and 
the President deserved particular respect.7 Arguments about judi­
cial administrability and certainty have played a role in statutory 
interpretation as well.8 Our claim here is not that the Supreme 
Court, or courts generally, ignore the institutional dimension, but 
that consideration of that dimension remains episodic and occa­
sional, and that more general theorizing about interpretation pays 
too little attention to it. 
Consider, for example, the view, often labeled "formalistic," 
which sees legitimate interpretation as requiring fidelity to the 
ordinary meaning of the relevant text when originally enacted.9 
Formalism is rejected by those who insist that legitimate interpre­
tation includes a variety of devices designed to ensure that sense, 
rather than nonsense, is made of the law.10 Many opponents of 
formalism urge, correctly, that devices of this kind are simply a 
part of how communication often works. 1 1  But under certain 
assumptions, formalism might be seen not as embodying an em-
4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
5. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
6. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But 
while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegatipn is a fundamental element of our con­
stitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts."). 
7. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981 ). 
8. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Origina/ism in Recent 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate 
and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1998). 
9. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-25 (1998); Manning, 
Textualism, supra note 2, at 36-52. 
10. See DWORKIN, supra note 2: William N. Eskridge, Jr., All Abolll Words: Early 
Understandings of the "ltulicial Power" in Statlllory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 990 (200 1 )  [hereinafter Eskridge, All About Words]. 
1 1. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Stattttory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 609 (1990). 
887 
888 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 10 I :885 
barrassingly crude understanding of communication, but as a sen­
sible and highly pragmatic response to institutional limits of gener­
alist judges and institutional capacities of Congress. We believe 
that in considering these debates, an institutional focus is helpful, 
not because it always resolves them, but because it shows what 
many disputes are really about, and because it casts light on cen­
tral questions that might otherwise be obscured. At a minimum, 
we urge that an appreciation of institutional capacities and dy­
namic effects is a necessary part of any theory of legal interpreta­
tion. A theory that neglects those issues is seriously incomplete. 
We also hope that future debates about interpretation will focus 
on institutional issues, where it remains possible to make a great 
deal of progress, not least by examining empirical issues, identified 
below, on which much remains to be learned. 
Why have modern interpretive theories neglected institutional 
issues? This is a large question, and we do not offer a full answer 
here; but we do have some speculations. Because of their own role, 
judges themselves naturally ask a particular question ("How is this 
text best interpreted?"), and that question naturally diverts atten­
tion from the issue of institutional capacities. Legal education, and 
the legal culture more generally, invite interpreters to ask the fol­
lowing role-assuming question: "If you were the judge, how would 
you interpret this text?" If the question is posed in that way, insti­
tutional issues drop out. The very form of the question makes 
them irrelevant. Academic observers, usually specialists in the 
subject at hand, often deplore judicial decisions as "wooden" or 
"formalistic," without appreciating the risk that generalist judges, 
unmoored from the text, might do even worse. Indeed it is possible 
that specialized interpreters should reject formalism but that 
nonspecialists should embrace it;12 and academic specialists are 
unlikely to appreciate this point. Our principal goal here is to pose 
the question of interpretation in a form that will sidestep these 
role-related and cognitive traps, enabling interpretive theory to 
highlight the neglected issues. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I is a catalogue of in­
fluential work on interpretation. We detail the pervasive indiffer­
ence in that work to institutional issues and also explain how that 
indifference has weakened the resulting analysis. We attempt to 
draw out the neglected questions in a way that will help show the 
range of variables that bear on the selection of interpretive strate­
gies by generalist judges. 
1 2. There are of course disputes about who counts as a specialist. Some courts. 
moreover, include specialists rather than generalists; consider the tax court and federal 
bankruptcy judges. It may well be that the appropriate interpretive stance for such spe­
cialists is different from that for generalist judges. 
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Part II responds to an obvious challenge to our claim: that 
judgments about institutional issues cannot be helpful without 
some kind of background normative account of interpretation. A 
second-best approach, one that asks about interpretive mistakes 
and dynamic effects, necessarily presupposes some first-best 
account. This is an important observation, and in a sense it is 
unexceptionable. But it fails to engage our central point, which is 
not that a first-best account is worthless or irrelevant, but that it is 
incomplete without a second-best account that takes account of 
institutional ·issues. Institutional analysis is necessary to the choice 
of interpretive rules, even if it is insufficient. In any case, we also 
offer a further, more ambitious claim: institutional analysis may 
indeed be sufficient in some settings, because it may allow inter­
preters who hold different commitments to converge on particular 
interpretive rules while bracketing disagreements about their 
preferred first-best accounts. 
Part III shows how a range of issues in public law might be 
recast if institutional issues are brought to the forefront. We sug­
gest that a formalist or textualist approach to statutes might be 
most plausibly defended, not by controversial claims about the 
Constitution or implausible claims about meaning, but through a 
suggestion that this approach might produce the most sensible sys­
tem of law, given the institutions that we actually have. We are 
confident that the standard defenses of formalism based on first 
principles are very weak; the same can be said for many of the 
standard challenges to formalism, also based on first principles. 
We also urge that even if courts should follow the ordinary mean­
ing of text, it is reasonable to suggest that administrative agencies 
need not, in part because agencies are specialists rather than gen­
eralists. Compared to courts, agencies are likely to have a good 
sense of whether a departure from formalism will seriously 
damage a regulatory scheme; hence it is appropriate to allow agen­
cies a higher degree of interpretive flexibility. 
Moving beyond statutory interpretation, Part III applies the in­
stitutional lens to issues of constitutional interpretation and the in­
terpretation of common law precedents. We explain how attention 
to institutional issues might shift the debate over competing meth­
ods of constitutional interpretation, making it necessary to ask 
some infrequently posed questions about judicial capacity to im­
plement various approaches. Although constitutional theory has 
become increasingly sophisticated about large-scale institutional 
questions, such as the allocation of lawmaking authority between 
legislatures and courts, it has continued to neglect the role of insti­
tutional considerations in the theory of constitutional interpreta­
tion py judges. Our analysis provides the tools needed to repair 
this flaw. Finally, we offer a brief note about the common law, 
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suggesting that similar institutional variables very much bear on 
the appropriate interpretation of judicial precedents. 
In these and other cases, our goal is not to settle on any par­
ticular view about what interpretation should entail, but to suggest 
that it is impossible to answer that question without looking at the 
institutional capacities of various actors and the dynamic effects of 
competing approaches. We claim, in short, that a focus on institu­
tional issues radically reframes the analysis of legal interpretation 
- and that it is long past time for those interested in interpreta­
tion to see what might be done with that reframing. 
I. INTERPRETATION WITHOUT IN STITUTIONS: A CATALOGUE 
Here we supply a panoramic tour of interpretive theory, and 
influential theorists, from three periods: the English debate over 
common law approaches to statutory interpretation (Section A), 
the formative era of modem interpretive theory (Section B), and 
contemporary accounts (Section C). Our limited objective is to 
document the blindness or insensitivity to institutional considera­
tions that pervades these theorists' work. We make no pretense of 
supplying a complete and adequately nuanced intellectual history 
of interpretive theory. Indeed, our catalogue will have the flavor of 
Whig History, praising theorists who anticipate the institutional 
turn and (far more often) condemning those who do not. But our 
goal is not merely critical. By exploring what has been neglected, 
we hope to make some movement toward the task, ventured in 
Parts II and III, of isolating the issues that must be faced by an ap­
proach to interpretation that is concerned with institutional capaci­
ties and dynamic effects. 13 
A. Common Law Interpretation and Bentham's Mistake 
We begin with Blackstone and Bentham, the foremost propo­
nent and critic, respectively, of the common law approach to statu­
tory interpretation. This approach has many shades and variants, 
which license varying degrees of judicial freedom in interpretation; 
but a central or defining idea is that judges appropriately sensitive 
to legislative purposes and to the surrounding fabric of law should 
13. In what follows, we will put aside the possibility that doctrines of statutory in­
terpretation might be legislated, rather than developed (solely) by judges in common 
Jaw fashion. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 
1 15  HARV. L. REV. 2086 (2002). Although the possibility is both important and inter­
esting, past history shows that it is most unlikely that Congress will enact rules of inter­
pretation that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice. For good 
reason, the literature on statutory interpretation, both past and present, focuses on the 
question of what interpretive rules judges should use absent legislative intervention; 
that is our focus here as well. 
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mold and shape statutes with something like the sensitivity and 
flexibility accorded to judicial precedents. In these respects, the 
common law approach is a precursor of the legal process school 
that came to dominate American interpretive theory after World 
War 11. 1 4  
Our critique, unsurprisingly, i s  that the common law style of  in­
terpretation presupposes a fanciful, even romantic account of judi­
cial capacities, and also fails to ask questions about likely legis­
lative responses to different judicial approaches. We will see, 
however, a major historical irony: Blackstone, the archetypal 
common law interpreter, came far closer to recognizing the sup­
pressed institutional questions, and the institutional case for for­
malist statutory interpretation, than did Bentham, the common 
law's principal critic. We will also see that later theorists, such as 
H.L.A. Hart, followed Bentham rather than Blackstone, and hence 
repeated Bentham's mistake. 
Blackstone. William Blackstone's brief account of statutory in­
terpretation in Book I of the Commentaries is easily the most 
famous description of the common law style of statutory interpre­
tation;15 Hart and Sacks featured it prominently in the legal 
process materials that influenced a generation of leading academic 
theorists.16 For Blackstone, the object of interpretation is to 
uncover the "will of the legislator" by "exploring his intentions" as 
manifested in "signs the most natural and probable."17 Despite this 
ceremonial bow to legislative supremacy, the discussion quickly 
turns from the words of the statute, of surrounding statutes, and 
the subject matter, to more fluid interpretive sources, particularly 
the "reason and spirit" of the law and the Aristotelian principle of 
"equity" - the latter being the power "of excepting those circum­
stances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself 
would have excepted."18 Interpretive equity, on this view, 
"depend[s], essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each 
individual case."19 
Here are all the hallmarks of the common law interpretive 
style: flexible treatment of statutory text, based on a nuanced sen­
sitivity to legislative intentions or purposes and to the surrounding 
1 4. See HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). 
15. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *59-62. 
16. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1 170. 
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *59. 
18. Id. at *61. 
19. Id. 
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fabric of the common law. Especially striking is the stylized as­
sumption that interpretation according to the "reason" or "equity" 
of the statute will capture the legislature's true intentions, or the 
intentions that rational legislators would have had if informed 
about the particular application at bar, as well as the accompany­
ing insistence that equity is necessarily a particularistic or case­
specific consideration. Under certain assumptions about institu­
tional capacities, the common law style might well be best; but 
Blackstone says nothing in defense of those assumptions, and fails 
even to acknowledge them as such. The discussion, almost until 
the very end, shows remarkably little awareness of several relevant 
possibilities: that judges might mistake legislative purposes; that 
they might do better by deferring to legislators' expressed judg­
ments about equity than by enforcing their own; that they might, 
by treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific benefits at 
the price of increased uncertainty, imposing resulting burdens on 
the interpretive system as a whole; that legislators, confronted with 
judges refusing to invoke purposes to make sense of text, might be 
more careful in advance and might make corrections as the need 
arises. 
Consider, as one example among many, Blackstone's remarka­
bly casual embrace of the "absurd-results" canon: the idea, in 
Blackstone's words, that 
where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if liter­
ally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of 
them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which 
enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished 
with the utmost severity,' was held after long debate not to extend to 
the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the 
street with a fit.20 
There is much to be said, pro and con, about interpretation to 
avoid absurd results; the relevant institutional variables are 
complex,21 and we shall say a fair bit about them here. What is im­
portant for present purposes is Blackstone's radical institutional 
blindness - his failure to identify those variables or to find them 
even relevant. It may well be true that, if apprised of the surgeon's 
case, the legislature would have provided a relevant exception. But 
it hardly follows that the legislature would necessarily wish the 
judges to provide the exception themselves, given the legislature's 
failure to do so. For many reasons, good and bad, the legislature 
20. Id. at *60. 
2 1 .  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A 
Response fO Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 7 15 ( 1 992); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Avoiding Regulawry Absurdity? A New Canon of Construclion, 32 ENVTL. LAW REP. 
1 1 .1 26 (2002). 
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might want to reserve to itself the authority to correct poorly 
drafted statutes. Perhaps the legislature would pot trust the judges' 
judgments about whether a result would be absurd; perhaps the 
legislature would be willing to tolerate occasional absurdity for the 
sake of clarity and predictability. Nor does it follow that, apart 
from the question of legislative preferences about judicial interpre­
tation, the best overall interpretive system would be one in which 
the judges possessed this case-specific power to modify seemingly 
absurd statutory applications in light of purpose, reason, and 
equity. To know whether that is true would require judgments 
about a range of matters Blackstone fails to consider, such as the 
rate of mistaken identification of absurd results and the ex ante ef � 
fects of such a power on legislative drafting; more on these matters 
below. 
All this said, the end of Blackstone's discussion offers a 
remarkable afterthought that, although barely sketched, antici­
pates some critical questions for interpretive theory by acknowl­
edging the role of second-best considerations. 
[L]aw, without equity, tho' hard and disagreeable, is much more de­
sirable for the public good, than equity without law; which would 
make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion 
[by producing] as many different rules of action laid down in our 
courts, as there are differences of capacity and sentiment in the 
human mind.22 
In this passage "law," cast in opposition to equity, seems to 
connote a formalist style of interpretation that enforces rules ap­
parent ·on the face of statutory texts, rather than molding those 
texts to background legal principles or attributed legislative pur­
poses. The first-best, Blackstone is suggesting, would be law and 
equity in an appropriate mix, distributed appropriately across 
cases. But if the mix is unstable, if judges must choose between 
enforcing law in all cases or doing equity in all cases, then resolute 
enforcement of statutory text is preferable on second-best 
grounds. 
On Blackstone's account, equity without law is defective on 
two counts: it "makes every judge a legislator" and introduces an 
unacceptable amount of uncertainty ("most infinite confusion") 
into the interpretive system.23 The first point is a gesture towards 
the separation of lawmaking power from adjudicative power; later 
we will argue that this sort of appeal is unhelpful, because it is too 
abstract to supply valid reasons for or against interpretive formal­
ism. Far more impressive and significant is the second point, 
22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *62. 
23. hi. 
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an early attempt to introduce institutional considerations and 
ex ante effects into interpretive theory. We will see, however, 
that Blackstone's passing insight proved infertile. Later theorists 
largely ignored the significance of second-best considerations. 
Bentham. It is illuminating to glance at the interpretive views 
of Jeremy Bentham, an imposing critic of common law adjudica­
tion in general and of Blackstone in particular. Bentham's critique 
of Blackstone's Commentaries develops the claim that common 
law adjudication is both incoherent and inconsistent with a ra­
tional, meaning utilitarian, legal order. The positive side of 
Bentham's program was the codification of utilitarian legal princi­
ples, and more generally a consolidation and expansion of legisla­
tion's domain that would bring clarity, certainty, and order to the 
law. Increasingly precise and comprehensive codification would 
ultimately cause adjudication itself to wither away, as citizens and 
officials could simply consult the code to ascertain their legal rights 
and duties. In the interim, however, Bentham was intermittently 
aware that statutes would contain gaps, ambiguities, and generali­
ties ill-adapted to specific cases - the usual sources of difficult in­
terpretive questions. Bentham thus discussed interpretation on 
several occasions, most prominently in the Comment on the 
Commentaries, which contains two substantial chapters on the 
"Interpretation of [L]aws" and the " [C]onstruction of [S]tatutes,"24 
although it is fair to say that he nowhere presents a fully developed 
account of statutory interpretation. 
For our purposes the significance of Bentham's work on inter­
pretation lies in his imperfect utilitarianism - his neglect of insti­
tutional variables in discussing the judicial role. Despite his pierc­
ing depiction of the sponginess of common law adjudication, which 
he equated with arbitrary judicial tyranny, Bentham failed to 
transpose his critique of judicial capacities to interpretive theory in 
any consistent way. The chapters on interpretation and construc­
tion in the Comment on the Commentaries manage both to 
approve flexible, purposivist interpretation devoted to forwarding 
legislative "ends," on the one hand, and on the other to mock the 
pretensions of common law interpretation by emphasizing what 
Bentham saw as the arbitrariness of judicial claims about "reason" 
and "equity." We see, for example, Bentham both supporting the 
absurd-results canon on purposive grounds, in Blackstone's exam­
ple of the surgeon prosecuted for "drawing blood" in the streets,i.� 
24. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 89-117, 137-61 (J. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) 
[hereinafter BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES). 
25. See id. at 1 1 1 .  160. Bentham sometimes intimates that he endorses purposivism 
and the absurd-results canon only in cases of ambiguous statutory language. See, e.g. ,  id. 
at 160. I t  requires some work, however, to square that qualification with Blackstone's 
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and also denying that the common law judge's appeal to reason or 
reasonableness is anything other than a statement of personal 
"opinion." On the one hand, "reasonableness or unreasonableness 
is nothing but conformity or nonconformity to . . .  opinion."26 On 
the other hand, " [t]he words of a legislator are no [sic] otherwise 
to be regarded than inasmuch as they are expressive of his will."27 
But these positions are in tension with each other. Recall that 
Blackstone's argument for purposive, equitable interpretation as­
sumed that reasonable legislators would have recognized the need 
for an exception, if made aware of the application at hand. 
Purposivism usually attributes goals or aims by envisioning rea­
sonable legislators acting reasonably; certainly that is the premise 
for purposivism in the later legal process account of interpretation, 
as we shall see.28 This may even be a necessary feature of 
purposivism; it may be conceptually impossible for judges to pro­
ceed by imagining what unreasonable legislators would do. So to 
deny that the j udges can assess the reasonableness or equity of 
some particular statutory application is also to deny purposivism; 
Bentham cannot have it both ways. Conversely, Blackstone's 
second-best argument for interpretive formalism was precisely that 
judicial disagreement about what is equitable would make inter­
pretation unacceptably subjective and uncertain (because of "dif­
ferences of capacity and sentiment"29 across judges). Bentham fails 
to appreciate that the rapier he uses to skewer the common law 
judges might be turned against the purposivist statutory interpreta­
tion he also embraces. 
Why might Bentham have neglected, in his critique of common 
law method, the institutional critique of flexible interpretation? 
There may be a clue in his most focused treatment of the relation­
ship between interpretation and judicial discretion - a short 
discussion in his great unpublished work on legislation, Of Laws in 
General. There Bentham argues that legislative mistakes - the 
enactment of statutes that are overinclusive or underinclusive rela­
tive to their purposes due to inadvertence, lack of foresight, or 
changed circumstances - require that j udges possess the power to 
"mould[] into form" statutes that would otherwise do "mischief." 30 
example, so it isn't clear how seriously we are to take it. See also JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 155 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1987) (urging that "laws should 
be literally followed"). 
26. BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES, supra note 24, at 159. 
27. Id. at 1 15. 
28. See the discussion of Hart and Sacks infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
29. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *62. 
30. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 239 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) [here­
inafter BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL]. 
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Yet this power in turn created the possibility that informational 
deficits or bad motives on the part of judges would pervert the 
legislative product and increase legal uncertainty: 
How difficult to distinguish what the legislator would have adopted 
had he adverted to it, from what he actually did advert to and reject. 
How easy to establish the one under pretence of looking for the 
other? ... And thus sprang up by degrees another branch of custom­
ary law, which striking its roots into the substance of the statute law, 
infected it with its own characteristic obscurity, uncertainty, and 
confusion.31 
This is a powerful indictment of purposivism and imaginative 
reconstruction. On the score of institutional sophistication, 
Bentham here outdoes his jurisprudential successors of the next 
century, including both H.L.A. Hart and the legal process scholars; 
we will see that the later accounts fail even to see the problem that 
Bentham poses. 
Yet for this Bentham himself must take a great deal of blame. 
The prescriptions he offered to cure the problems of purposivism 
rest on the same sort of idealized or stylized view of institutional 
capacities that infects most of Blackstone's treatment, and that 
Bentham might have been expected to transcend. Bentham first 
suggests that "the necessity of discretionary interpretation" can be 
"supersede[ d]" by the development of a sufficiently perspicacious 
legislative code (doubtless the code developed in Bentham's own 
extensive proposals for law reform).32 But this idealizes legislative 
capacities, thus reversing the characteristic error of common law 
interpretation.33 Bentham himself recognizes, both here and 
elsewhere, that institutional limitations on legislatures make the 
project of a fully specified code fantastic. So Bentham abashedly 
sketches a fallback plan, never fully developed, whereby judges 
would "declare openly" the need for judicial "alteration" of a stat­
ute in appropriate cases, and certify a proposed emendation to the 
legislature; the emendation would have legal force unless "nega­
tived" or vetoed by the legislature within a certain time.34 Absent 
from the proposal is any explanation why the judges, whose infor­
mation and motivations Bentham has so powerfully impeached, 
will be able to distinguish alterations from interpretations or be 
willing to comply with the plan even where alterations are identifi­
able as such. 
3 1 .  Id. at 240. 
32. Id. 
33. Hart provides a helpful correction here. See infra notes 39-49 and accompany­
ing text. 
34. BENTHAM, Or LAWS IN GENERAL, supra note 30, at 241 .  
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Taking Blackstone and Bentham together, the striking irony is 
that the common law jurist more nearly appreciates and antici­
pates the second-best justifications for formalist, rule-bound statu­
tory interpretation than does the great critic of the common law. 
Bentham's turn into the blind alley of complete codification, under 
the influence of an idealized picture of legislative capacities, did 
little more than create a target for subsequent critics, such as 
H.L.A. Hart, who could justify antiformalist interpretation by 
pointing to the limits of legislative foresight while overlooking the 
countervailing limits on the capacities of antiformalist interpreters. 
B. The Modern Era: Positivism, Purposivism, and Integrity 
We now turn to the defining period of modern jurisprudence. 
In this period, academic observers largely attempted to steer a 
middle course between formalism and realism.35 They argued that 
interpretation was not merely a matter of following established 
rules, but also that it was far from simple or direct policy analysis.36 
For present purposes, we focus on the critique of formalism and on 
the institutional blindness of that critique - not to show that for­
malism is right, but to identify the issues on which its acceptance or 
rejection might turn. One of the most striking features of the pe­
riod is that it was dominated by the work of the "legal process" 
school, whose central mission was to focus attention on institu­
tional considerations. And indeed, the legal process materials do 
talk a great deal about comparative institutional compe.tence,37 and 
35. See, e.g. , EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). 
We do not discuss the realists themselves, though it is noteworthy that they tended to 
argue for candid and open-ended judicial policymaking in the face of ambiguous stat­
utes, without grappling with the risks posed by judicial discretion. See, e.g. , Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons Abatti 
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 ( 1 950) (suggesting, after 
challenging the canons of construction, that courts should "strive to make sense as a 
whole out of our law as a whole," without engaging the obvious institutional problems 
raised by any such effort). Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 
884 (1930), criticizes the conventional sources of interpretation and suggests that the 
real question is: "Will the inclusion of this particular determinate in the statutory de­
terminable lead to a desirable result?" Radin does not address the difficulties that 
courts might face in answering that question. Of course we do not deny the possibility 
that the sources of law favored by the formalist -above all, the text - will leave ambi­
guities; in such cases, institutional considerations are highly relevant to the decision of 
how to proceed. Chevron U.S.A. ,  Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), represents an institutionally grounded choice to leave the resolution to 
the relevant administrative agency. See Section IIl.B below for discussion. A realist­
style emphasis on the effects of social position on judicial decisionmaking and the risks 
of bias would of course amplify concerns about judicial capacities. 
36. See, e.g. , LEVI, supra note 35, at 3-8. 
37. HART & SACKS, supra note 1 4, at 1 58-72 (surveying the major lawmaking insti­
tutions and their relationships). 
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do discuss the relevance of agency interpretations of law.38 Even in 
those materials, however, the question of interpretation is 
answered by asking about how ideal judges would proceed rather 
than by asking about how real-world judges should proceed. But to 
say this is to get ahead of the story; let us begin with H.L.A. Hart, 
simply because his treatment of legal interpretation can be seen as 
canonical. 
Hart. In his discussion of mechanical jurisprudence and rule­
skepticism, Hart offers a highly influential account of the failures 
of formalism - an account that, remarkably, says not a word 
about institutional issues.39 A chief contribution of the account is a 
clear and convincing explanation of why Bentham was wrong to 
hope that a rule-bound legislative code could sensibly resolve all 
cases that might arise under it.40 What is absent is a serious treat­
ment of how institutions should respond to the inevitability that 
unexpected cases will confound the expectations of rulemakers. 
Hart's principal submission is that in hard cases, interpretive 
problems arise from legislators' "inability to anticipate."4 1 It is, in 
his view, a "feature of the human predicament (and so the legisla­
tive one) that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever 
we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere 
of conduct by means of general standards to be used without fur­
ther official direction on particular occasions. "42 These handicaps 
are "our relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indetermi­
nacy of aim."43 Mechanical jurisprudence or formalism, involving 
simple application of law to fact (Bentham's utopia), would be 
possibly only if "the world in which we live were characterized 
only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the 
modes in which they combine could be known to us."44 But 
"[p]lainly this world is not our world."45 
Hart claims that the "vice known to legal theory as formalism 
or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated 
rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for . . .  
choice, once the general rule has been laid down. "46 This is some­
times done by freezing "the meaning of the rule so that its general 
38. Id. at 1 271-312 (examining administrative interpretation of statutes). 
39. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120-30 ( 196 1  ). 
40. Id. al 1 25-26. 
41. Id. at 125. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. al 126. 
February 2003] Interpretation and Institutions 
terms must have the same meaning in every case where its applica­
tion is in question."47 And what is wrong with that freezing? Hart 
has a simple answer. He urges that this approach secures 
a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly pre­
judging what is to be done in a range of future cases, about whose 
composition we are ignorant. We shall thus indeed succeed in set­
tling in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only be rea­
sonably be settled when they arise and are identified.48 
And what is wrong with decision in the dark? Hart urges that this 
kind of decision forces us "to include in the scope of a rule cases 
which we would wish to exclude in order to give effect to reason­
able social aims . . . .  "49 
Hart is entirely right to urge that the absence of legislative 
foresight is inevitable and that this can create serious problems for 
interpretation. But notice Hart's apparently unselfconscious use of 
the word "we" to identify the interpreting authority. Of course 
Hart's readers do not constitute a community of "we's" who have 
the power to adopt a mutually agreeable approach to interpreta­
tion. And once it is seen that a system of interpretation must be es­
tablished that some "they" must apply, the assessment of "decision 
in the dark" as opposed to decision based on "reasonable social 
aims" will appear in a very different light. If we make our assess­
ment in institutional terms, we will see that Hart is neglecting two 
points. The first involves the risk of judicial blunder under one or 
another approach; the second involves the dynamic effects of one 
or another approach to interpretation. 
Suppose, for example, that judges will err if they attempt to 
discern "reasonable social aims." At least it is conceivable, in light 
of human fallibility, that some judges would do better, by the lights 
of many or most, if they refused to inquire into reasonable aims. 
An important factor here is that it is sometimes complicated to 
make that inquiry; an equally important factor is that sometimes 
people dispute how to answer it. Take TV A v. Hill,50 the famous 
snail darter case, raising the question whether the Endangered 
Species Act ("ESA") should be taken to block the completion of 
an important dam, because of the late discovery, on the land, of an 
ecologically unimportant fish. Does this application of the ESA 
violate reasonable social aims? People do not agree about the an­
swer to that question. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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In addition, a sensible system of interpretation is based on an 
understanding that dynamic effects are highly likely; it sees that 
the judges' approach will not be limited in its effects to the imme­
diate parties or even to the system of adjudication.51 Hart seems 
oblivious to this point. Suppose that courts, deciding the issue in 
the light, will introduce a high degree of uncertainty into the law, 
making it harder for people to plan their affairs. Suppose too that 
if they proceed in the dark, they will create strong incentives for 
the legislature, which will promptly correct the problems that 
arise.52 In these circumstances, might not formalism be the most 
sensible path? What is most remarkable is that Hart appears not to 
see the problem at all. 
Hart and Sacks. Now consider the influential treatment by 
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in their enormously influential legal 
process materials.53 In a brilliant "note on the rudiments of statu­
tory interpretation," Hart and Sacks urge that the task of interpre­
tation requires courts, first and foremost, to "decide what purpose 
ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provi­
sion of it which may be involved," and to "interpret the words of 
the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose 
as best it can."54 Hart and Sacks caution that courts should not give 
words a meaning that their text will not bear. But they also urge 
that courts should require Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to 
accomplish certain ends, including "a departure from a generally 
prevailing principle or policy of the law."55 These are the building 
blocks for � complex system of interpretation, in which judges 
treat legislators as "reasonable people proceeding reasonably," 
make "purpose" crucial to interpretation, and push statutory 
language, where fairly possible, in the direction of sense and con­
sistency with the rest of the law's fabric. 
In the abstract, this approach seems perfectly sensible, and we 
will not argue that it is indefensible here. But to evaluate it, we 
need to know how well judges are able to execute the suggested 
approach, and how other persons and institutions will react to it. 
51. As we later suggest, this point strengthens the argument for respecting common 
law precedents. See infra Section 1 1 1 .C. See also infra Section 1 1 .C, where we suggest 
various factors that might militate in favor of a more measured approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
52. Note here that Congress ultimately authorized completion of the dam involved 
in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 1 53 (1978), see infra note 70, and also significantly amended the 
Delaney Clause in response to concerns about excessive rigidity, see Food Quality 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 1 10 Stat. 1489 ( 1996). 
53. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1 374-80. 
54. Id. at 1 374. 
55. Id. at 1377. Related issues were raised in the context of American slavery. For 
discussion, see ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). 
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The fact that Hart and Sacks do not explore these issues is ex­
tremely revealing, for a primary contribution of the legal process 
materials was to put the spotlight on institutional issues, and 
indeed to assess much of law in a pragmatic spirit. With respect to 
legal interpretation, Hart and Sacks did not keep the institutional 
project in mind, perhaps because of the tenacity of the common 
law framework with which they began. "Purposes" are their 
loadstar; but purposes are hardly transparent. Is the purpose of the 
Delaney Clause to eliminate carcinogenic substances from the 
food supply? To make Americans safer? To improve the world? 
The characterization of purposes involves a large element of dis­
cretion, and here it is necessary to know how the discretion will be 
exercised. Sometimes the characterization of purposes will have a 
significant political or even ideological component. Hart and Sacks 
pay no attention to that issue; they seem to think that it is irrele­
vant. 
General lessons cannot be drawn from the practice of interpre­
tation under fascism, but for our purposes, some illumination can 
be found from the disparate practices of Italian and German 
courts. The Italian judiciary, faced with a totalitarian regime, en­
gaged in a strategy of resistance based on the idea of "plain 
meaning."56 They prohibited the government from acting in a way 
that did violence to the apparent meaning of statutory texts.57 This 
was a self-conscious method for limiting fascist government, by re­
quiring genuine statutory authorization for its goals. By. contrast, 
German judges rejected formalism and construed statutes �ospita­
bly and in accordance with their "purposes," as defined by refer­
ence to the public values of the Nazi regime.58 They thought that 
courts could carry out their interpretive task "only if they· do not 
remain glued to the letter of the law, but rather penetrate its inner 
core in their interpretations and do their part to see that the aims 
of the lawmaker are realized."59 Thus, for example, the German 
Supreme Court concluded that a law forbidding "sexual 
intercourse" between Germans and Jews "is . . .  not limited to 
coition . . . .  A broad interpretation is . . .  appropriate in view of the 
fact that the provisions of the law are meant to protect not only 
German blood but also German honor."60 A lower court went so 
far as to conclude that kissing could take "the place of normal 
56. See the account in Guido Calabresi, Essay: Two Functions of Formalism. 67 
.U. CHI. L. REV. 479 (2000). 
57. Id. 
58. See lNGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE; THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991). 
59. Id. at 101 .  
60. Id. at 100-01 (citation omitted). 
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sexual intercourse" and therefore violate the statute in such a way 
as to justify a two-year jail sentence.6t 
Of course we do not suggest that purposive interpretation is an 
ally of fascism, or that it is always illegitimate or unacceptable. Our 
only claim is that the evaluation of purposive interpretation must 
depend, in large part, on an assessment of the relevant institutions 
and of the effects of that approach over time. It is ludicrous to sug­
gest that purposive interpretation is best in the abstract, for the 
simple reason that no approach to interpretation is best in the ab­
stract. Here, as elsewhere, Hart and Sacks's elaborate talk about 
institutional competence is undercut by their stylized, nonempiri­
cal treatment of actual institutions and their capacities. 
Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin is often taken to be H.L.A. Hart's 
antagonist, urging an approach that Dworkin calls "integrity," 
meant to be alternative to Hart's form of positivism.62 But on the 
issue that concerns us, Dworkin shares Hart's blindness. On 
Dworkin's account, judges who seek "integrity" attempt to put 
existing legal materials in "the best light possible."63 They owe a 
duty of fidelity to those materials, but they are also authorized to 
attempt to understand the materials by reference to what they see 
as the most appealing principle that organizes them. "Law as in­
tegrity asks judges to assume, as far as this is possible, that the law 
is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fair­
ness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these 
in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's 
situation is fair and just according to the same standards."64 In ar­
guing for this understanding of adjudication, Dworkin says too lit­
tle about the virtues and the imperfections of judges and the sys­
temic effects of one or another approach to interpretation. 
Dworkin devotes a great deal of space to Riggs v. Palmer,65 the 
famous case posing the question whether judges should adopt a 
literal interpretation of the law of wills if the consequence would 
be to allow a murderer to inherit from his victim.66 And Dworkin is 
not wrong to argue that Riggs "was a dispute about what the law 
was, about what the real statute the legislators enacted really 
said. "67 But it is inadequate to cast the issue in those terms. The 
61 .  Id. at 102. 
62. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 2. 
63. hi. at 243. 
64. lei. 
65. 22 N.E. 1 88 ( 1889). 
66. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 15-20. 
67. Id. at 20. We say that this is not wrong, but it seems to us unhelpful. Neither 
view in Riggs could be said to be lawless. But to ask what the law "really said" obscures 
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dispute was about the appropriate approach to a statute whose lit­
eral text produces absurdity. If courts ask about the meaning of 
"the real statute the legislators enacted," they will not be asking 
some of the crucial questions. 
Dworkin does not say how he would decide Riggs, but he does 
offer a conclusion about the appropriate resolution of TV A v. Hill. 
Dworkin supposes that his idealized judge, Hercules, "shares the 
substantive opinion that seemed dominant on the [Supreme] 
Court, that the wiser course would be to sacrifice the fish to the 
dam."68 If so, Dworkin urges, it is "not difficult" to see how 
Hercules will vote, because he "thinks reading the statute to save 
the dam would make it better from the point of view of sound 
policy."69 Given that judgment, Hercules will vote to allow the dam 
to be completed. 
But to know how to vote in TV A v. Hill, is it really enough to 
consult "sound policy"? Here Dworkin sounds very much like 
Hart, urging that statutory language should not be taken to conflict 
with reasonable social purposes. Other things being equal, the 
claim is surely correct. But it is important to ask whether Congress 
would overturn a literal interpretation of the ESA, if the conse­
quence was indeed to violate sound policy. Subsequent events 
showed that Congress was entirely willing to do that.70 And it is 
also important to ask about the systemic effects of a ruling that 
would allow the dam to be completed. If that were the ruling, what 
would the ESA actually mean? Would subsequent cases become 
hard too? If this question is in turn difficult to answer, then the 
consequences of the ruling, in itself sensible, might in their way 
conflict with "sound policy" as well.71 And in cases of this sort, do 
we have good reason to trust judges' views about sound policy? If 
the question is highly politicized, if people disagree along partisan 
the key issue, which is how judges should interpret it, given the institutional variables 
discussed in the text. 
68. Id. at 347. 
69. Id. 
70. Congress promptly established an administrative mechanism for granting ex­
emptions from the Endangered Species Act, see Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 , 3752-
60 (1978), and Congress itself specifically exempted the dam at issue in TVA v. /-/ill, 437 
U.S. 153 (1978). See Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449 (1979). 
71.  Of course it will not always be easy to assess, in advance, these consequences. 
But the key question is whether the statute, after the departure from formalism, leaves 
subsequent judges with many open issues, or whether it instead becomes a rule with a 
limited, well-understood exception. If the Court ruled. in TVA v. /-lilt, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978), that the protection of endangered species does not prohibit government actions 
that are "near completion," subsequent judges would have a great deal to grapple with, 
because the idea of being "near completion" is hardly self-defining. The point we are 
stressing here is that the argument for departing from formalism is weakest when sub­
sequent courts are at sea, and strongest when the exception is clear and crisp. 
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lines, or if a high degree of technical expertise is required,72 judicial 
judgments might well be unreliable. These points suggest that it is 
hardly enough to ask, as Dworkin urges, which interpretation of 
the ESA would best complete the story that Congress has begun. 
If institutional considerations are taken into account, we might 
conclude that judges should ask themselves a very different set of 
questions. 
Where statutes are entirely ambiguous, it is impossible to de­
cide cases simply by reference to their words. But in TV A v. Hill, 
the words were far more easily taken to ban the completion of the 
dam; and judicial unreliability, on conflicts between environmental 
and economic goals, might well be taken to argue in favor of for­
malism.73 What is striking about Dworkin's analysis is that it is 
undertaken without any thought at all about judicial capacities and 
about the effects, over time, of one or another approach to inter­
pretation. Like Hart, Dworkin proceeds as if the question is how 
an idealized judge deals with interpretive problems - not how a 
real-world judge, operating as part of a deci.sionmaking committee 
staffed by multiple actors, should proceed in the face of uncer­
tainty. 
C. Contemporary Theory: Dynamism, Textualism, and 
Pragmatism 
Contemporary interpretive theory is increasingly sophisticated 
along many margins. Philosophy (including pragmatist antifounda­
tionalism), linguistics, and economics have all contributed to 
ever more refined normative accounts of interpretation. Yet on 
the critical dimension of institutional awareness, many of the most 
prominent contemporary theorists do no better than their prede­
cessors, or so we will claim. Institutional blindness remains a per­
vasive condition in the current scene. 
Eskridge. William Eskridge has a claim to being the most 
prominent interpretive theorist of the modern era; his identifica­
tion and critique of the "new textualism,"74 and his advocacy of 
72. Of course amicus briefs might provide some help in this regard, though their 
reliability is weakened by the fact that they often come from well-organized groups with 
a stake in the outcome. 
73. Consider in this re!!,ard the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century struggle 
between courts and the regulatory slate, in which judges. trying to harmonize regulatory. 
statutes with the common law, tended to require Congress to speak unambiguously if it 
sought to depart from judicial understandings, and abandoned plain or ordinary mean­
ing in order lo minimize conflicts with those understandings. The result was to limit the 
reach of statutes designed to protect workers and consumers. See, e.g. , FTC v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298. 305-06 ( 1 924): Shaw v. R.R. Co .. 101  U.S. 557, 565 (1880). 
74. See William N. Eskridge. Jr., The New Textualism. 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
( 1 990). 
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"dynamic interpretation,"75 redefined the field in the late 1980s. 
Yet a neglect of institutional factors undercuts Eskridge's conclu­
sions just as it did his predecessors'.76 Dynamic statutory interpre­
tation, it turns out, embodies the nirvana fallacy - the juxtaposi­
tion of an idealized picture of judicial capacities with a grudging 
picture of the capacities of other actors in the interpretive system. 
Eskridge's principal target is the formalist approach that em­
phasizes the original meaning of statutory text; his principal criti­
cism is that this approach stumbles on the problem of statutory 
obsolescence - statutes that have fallen out of step with the public 
values prevailing in the surrounding context of the legal system. 
Dynamic interpretation is the answer to the problem of obsoles­
cence. Rather than adhering either to ordinary meaning at the 
time of enactment, or even to legislative intent conceived in strictly 
originalist terms, courts should "update" statutes by intelligent 
adaptation of original purposes to new social circumstances, and 
by taking account of changes in the overall fabric of public law.77 
Yet Eskridge is sensitive to the radicalism of this recommendation, 
which he moderates and improves by adding a side constraint: 
judges should treat contemporary public values as something like 
an interpretive principle or canon, defeasible by clear contrary in­
structions from legislatures.78 
At first glance this position is attractive, even compelling; how 
could "wooden" or "mechanical" enforcement of obsolete statutes 
possibly be the best course of action for judges to take? Eskridge's 
claims certainly have some descriptive power, and on certain 
assumptions, they might be plausible on institutional grounds as 
well. Yet Eskridge fails to discuss those assumptions or those 
grounds. He does not sufficiei;itly explore how the case for dy­
namic interpretation fares once we recognize the possibility that 
judges will make serious mistakes in updating, or that the ex ante 
effects of dynamism on legislative behavior might prove perni­
cious.79 We may agree with Eskridge that judicial updating is a 
good thing, all else equal, but the proviso is crucial. The possibility 
of judicial mistakes, or of deleterious systemic effects, makes 
75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory /111erpreU/tion. 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory /111erpretatio11]. 
76. Candor requires an acknowledgement that one of the present authors showed a 
similar blindness in his youth (adolescence? infancy?). See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
77. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 75. at 1484. 
78. /cl. at 1542-44. 
79. Though Eskridge addresses these issues in passing, see id. at 1 533-38. he con­
cludes that, "[t]he slowness and deliberateness of judicial lawmaking ensures that it will 
never be a threat to legislated lawmaking as the main source of policy preference and 
priorities in the United States." Id. at 1537. 
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Eskridge's defense of dynamism radically incomplete. Dynamic in­
terpretation might or might not prove justified, given adequate 
information on these variables; here as elsewhere we take no posi­
tion on that ultimate question. What is clear is that Eskridge has 
failed to give adequate attention to some of the critical questions. 
Start with the question of judicial error. The linchpin of dyna­
mism is the claim that "when societal conditions change in ways 
not anticipated by Congress and, especially, when the legal and 
constitutional context of the statute decisively shifts as well, this 
current perspective should, and will, affect the statute's interpreta­
tion."80 This is essentially a recommendation to minimize the false 
negative or Type II error: the possibility that nondynamic ap­
proaches will erroneously fail to update obsolete statutes. But 
Eskridge says very little about the converse possibility, the false 
positive or Type I error: the risk that the judges' relative social in­
sulation, and the resulting informational deficits, might cause them 
to err in the other direction, updating statutes that aren't obsolete 
because the judges fail to comprehend the statute's current social 
utility. If judicial updating produces erroneous rewriting of statutes 
whose sensible and fully up-to-date justifications the judges have 
simply failed to understand, then dynamism may cause more insti­
tutional failure than .would a rule denying judges the authority to 
update. In any case, updating may cause harm if the new values, 
not yet able to receive clear democratic support, are questionable 
on normative grounds. (Is it entirely irrelevant to mention that 
Nazi judges were enthusiastic updaters?) 
Eskridge also overlooks the possibility that the systemic effects 
of nondynamic interpretive approaches would prove better, on 
Eskridge's own criteria, than would the systemic effects of dyna­
mism. Eskridge supports his case for dynamism by drawing upon 
process theory and public choice, arguing that "the legislature 
acting alone will be subject to . . .  biases,"81 and that "given the 
biases of the political process, the fact that judges are not .elected 
may enable them to be better 'representatives' of the people than 
their elected legislators are (in some instances)."82 It may be true 
that interest-group pressure and institutional failures will cause 
Congress to update statutes with insufficient frequency, relative to 
some optimal rate of policy change. But that failure might itself be 
an endogenous consequence of the interpretive theory the judges 
use. Textualists indeed argue that their methods will spur legisla-
80. Id. at 1494. 
81. Id. at 1530. 
82. hi. 
February 2003] Interpretation and Institutions 
tores to update at an optimal rate,83 and there is certainly some 
evidence of updating in response to textualism.84 If so, then textu­
alism would itself just be the dynamic approach to interpretation 
that Eskridge advocates. On certain empirical premises about in­
stitutional capacities, Eskridge ought to support the very textual­
ism that he spends so much time excoriating. 
In later work, Eskridge episodically shows an awareness of 
these considerations, acknowledging, in the limited context of the 
legislative-history debate, that the desirability of judicial resort to 
legislative history turns importantly on a cost-benefit calculus that 
examines judicial performance, litigation costs, and legal certainty 
in competing legislative-history regimes.85 Yet he also seems to 
think this sort of analysis theoretically disreputable or empirically 
intractable or both. In even more recent work, Eskridge reverses 
his ground, arguing both that empiricism is conceptually meaning­
less without normative premises (a question we address below) 
and that the relevant empirical and institutional variables are 
costly to measure - certainly true, but hardly an argument for 
nonempirical interpretive theory.86 The sum of it is that, as with 
some of the other theorists we will consider, Eskridge occasionally 
notes the critical institutional considerations in passing but fails to 
incorporate them into his normative account of interpretation in 
any systematic way. 
It is worth emphasizing that none of these considerations nec­
essarily refutes Eskridge's dynamic conclusions. If judges update 
successfully more often than not, and if textualist interpretation 
causes legislatures to spend most of their time correcting mistaken 
(because wooden or mechanical) judicial interpretations, then tex­
tualism would prove inferior to dynamic interpretation; Eskridge's 
methods would push the courts closer to the optimal · rate of 
updating. But there is no valid path to that conclusion from 
Eskridge's institutionally insensitive premises. 
Manning. Among contemporary writers, Eskridge's chief for­
malist adversary is John Manning, whose work details an impor­
tant textualist account of interpretation rooted in constitutional 
law, in contrast to Eskridge's nontextualist dynamism. For our 
purposes, however, the common ground between Eskridge and 
Manning is more important than their differences. Strikingly, 
83. See Adrian Venneule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 103 (2000). 
84. The Delaney Clause was substantially amended by the Food Quality Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). 
85. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1509, 1541 (1998). 
86. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999). 
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despite spirited debates between them, Eskridge and Manning 
largely share the crucial and mistaken premise that the important 
questions about interpretive theory are first-best questions, rather 
than second-best questions about institutional performance and 
systemic effects. 
Manning's work shows that insufficient attention to institu­
tional capacities is an equal opportunity hazard, one that afflicts 
nonformalists and formalists alike. Manning's contribution is to 
have provided the most rigorous attempt to justify formalist modes 
of interpretation by reference to formal sources of law, principally 
the Constitution. In our view, however, the project is an impossible 
one; it is doomed to failure despite Manning's skill at deductive 
reasoning from constitutional premises. Interpretive formalism at 
the operational level - formalism in the jurisprudentially modest 
sense of rule-bound interpretation that sticks close to the surface 
of statutory texts, where it is possible to do so - cannot itself be 
justified by conceptual deduction from constitutional premises. 
Supplemental institutional and empirical premises are needed, 
premises about the comparative capacities of institutional actors 
and about formalism's ex ante effects. 
Consider Manning's influential critique of judicial resort to 
legislative history.87 The argument suggests that the Constitution, 
particularly Article l's procedure of statutory enactment, should 
be read to embody an implicit norm against legislative self­
delegation. That constitutional norm forbids courts to afford 
"authoritative" weight to legislative history in statutory interpreta­
tion, but allows consultation of legislative history as a persuasive 
or confirmatory source.88 But this deduction, even if valid, leaves 
open the most important questions about legislative history at the 
operative level, the level of the interpretive doctrines that judges 
should use. Few people think that the legislative history is 
"authoritative" in the sense that it trumps unambiguous text; the 
usual argument is that the history is relevant to ascertaining 
meaning. That courts may not afford legislative history authorita­
tive weight does not tell us whether courts should use legislative 
history at all. That question, the crucial one, cannot be resolved 
through Manning's methods; its resolution depends on institu­
tional issues. Manning's position forbids the judges to afford leg­
islative history authoritative weight, but nothing in the analysis 
suggests that the Constitution either requires or forbids the judges 
to consult legislative history for its persuasive value. The judges 
87. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondefegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
673, 695 (1997). 
88. Id. at 728. 
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presumably retain constitutional discretion to use it, or to eschew 
its use, on other grounds. Whether they should do so is a function 
of the consequences of the various alternative rules about legisla­
tive history that the judges might adopt; those consequences will 
turn on institutional facts about judges' capacities as interpreters 
of legislative history and the ex ante effects on legislative drafting. 
The general point here is that the formal constitutional 
premises that Manning marshals, such as the textual separation of 
powers and its original understanding, mandate neither formalist 
interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive methods.89 The 
Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal about the 
contested issues of statutory interpretation; what it does say is of­
ten so minimal and so abstract as to leave open all the reasonably 
disputed questions of interpretive choice. Article I of the 
Constitution, for example, specifies the conditions for the enact­
ment of valid statutes,90 and the Supremacy Clause mandates that 
constitutionally valid statutes are supreme law,91 so all major inter­
pretive approaches agree that judges should respect the statutory 
text. But no provision sets out explicit instructions to judges about 
what other sources or considerations are admissible and relevant 
to help interpret the text. Nor do abstractions like the separation 
of powers supply much in the way of concrete guidance. Textually, 
provisions like the vesting clauses of Articles I and III separate 
legislative from judicial power, but textualists, intentionalists, pur­
posivists, and others can all validly claim that their preferred 
method respects this weak constraint.92 At the level of express 
commands, the Constitution simply does not choose sides in the 
competition between first-best interpretive approaches that char­
acterizes modern legal theory. 
Furthermore, any supplemental instructions that can be elicited 
from the text, or infused into it through structural and historical 
89. But see John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 686 (1999) (rejecting the "contention that the Constitution has 
little to say about the choice between formalist and antiformalist methodologies"). 
Manning's view here is appropriately nuanced; he disavows any suggestion that "infer­
ences from constitutional structure will always provide clear answers to questions of 
interpretive design," and notes that "[w]hen they do not, the judiciary may have room 
to make choices among particular interpretive strategies." ld. at 692-93. 
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I , § 7 (detailing procedures of bicameral approval and pre­
sentment to the President, and requiring that a "bill" must undergo those procedures to 
become a "law"). 
91. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that "Laws of the United States" made 
"in pursuance [of the Constitution] . . .  shall be the supreme Law of the Land"). 
92. Compare Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 10-15 {basing textualism on the 
separation of legislative and judicial power), with T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating 
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 23 (1988) (noting that intentionalism is 
grounded in respect for legislative supremacy). 
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analysis, prove compatible with most plausible positions on the 
contested problems of statutory interpretation. Consider the 
recent debate between Manning and Eskridge over the original 
understanding of the Article III "judicial Power."93 Manning says 
that the grant of judicial power, understood both historically 
and in light of structural inferences from other provisions, bars 
"equitable" interpretation of the Blackstonian sort and thus com­
mands federal courts to follow a "faithful agent" account of inter­
pretation.94 Eskridge says that the Blackstonian appeal to statutes' 
equity and spirit has a better historical pedigree than faithful-agent 
approaches, and that courts interpreting equitably are helpful 
partners in the process of lawmaking - and thus better agents, 
even on Manning's own terms, than are courts enslaved to a hier­
archical vision of legislative supremacy.95 This is a fight that can 
end only in stalemate. As for the history, there are respectable bits 
of originalist evidence on both sides, and no agreed upon origi­
nalist criterion or metaprocedure exists for adjudicating between 
them. As for the structural inferences, constitutional premises 
about equity, agency and legislative supremacy are pitched at 
too high a level of generality to cut between competing views 
about, say, the interpretive value of committee reports or the 
absurd-results canon. 
The important point here is that the Manning/Eskridge debate 
rests on an assumption, common to both parties, that the contest 
of interpretive theories must take place on constitutional terrain. 
But the best reading of the Constitution is that interpretive for­
malism and interpretive antiformalism are constitutionally op­
tional for judges. On this view, Manning's project fails, not by vir­
tue of any failure in execution, but by virtue of its intrinsic 
limitations: the tools of constitutional formalism are too weak to 
produce closure, by themselves, on the contested questions of in­
terpretive doctrine. Those questions require empirical and institu­
tional analysis in addition to first-best theorizing from constitu­
tional premises. 
Richard Posner. We conclude our catalogue with Judge 
Richard Posner, the leading advocate of the view that conse­
quences should matter to a theory of legal interpretation. In his 
early writing on statutory interpretation, Posner endorsed an 
"imaginative-reconstruction" approach, asking judges to recon­
struct the views of the enacting legislature and to do what it would 
93. Compare Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 10-15,. and John F. Manning, 
Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1648 (2001), with Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 10. 
94. Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 57-58, 126-27. 
95. Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 10, at 997, 1087. 
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have done, had it been presented with the case at hand.96 This ap­
proach, borrowed in part from Learned Hand,97 is an expanded 
version of Blackstone's idea that judges should make exceptions to 
overbroad statutes in "those circumstances, which (had they been 
foreseen), the legislator himself would have excepted."98 Like 
Blackstone's approach, imaginative reconstruction is blind to insti­
tutional considerations of the sort that we have been emphasizing 
throughout. That the legislature, if informed of the application at 
hand, would have adopted a particular statutory amendment does 
not mean that it would want the judges to do so on their own ini­
tiative. And if judges frequently err in their counterfactual suppo­
sitions about what the legislature would have done, then imagina­
tive reconstruction may, even on its own terms, push the juµges 
even farther away from the legislature's intentions than unimagi­
native textualism would have. 
More recently, Posner has endorsed a pragmatic account of 
adjudication generally, one that subsumes a pragmatic account of 
statutory interpretation.99 The pragmatic account should be fertile 
soil for the sort of institutional analysis needed in interpretive 
theory. Pragmatism, as Posner uses the term, is a form of conse­
quentialism, hospitable territory for the approach urged here. Our 
theme is precisely that interpretive rules can't sensibly be chosen 
without consideration of institutional consequences. And indeed 
Posner does recognize the possibility that the pragmatic judge 
might, on certain empirical premises about the institutional capaci­
ties of judges and legislatures, decide that interpretive formalism 
at the operational level would itself be the pragmatically best 
course of action.100 
Yet this possibility remains, for Posner, an abstract and unap­
pealing one. As soon as possible he falls back upon a distinction 
between consequences for the "case at hand" and the "systemic" 
consequences of decisions. On this view, the pragmatist maximand 
is to do what is best in the case at hand, subject to a side­
constraint: that case-specific adjudication not produce unaccept-
96. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation 
of Stallltes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) [hereinafter 
Posner, Legal Formalism]. 
97. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley .Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1 914) 
(Hand, J.). 
98. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *61. 
99. See, e.g. , Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235-53 
(Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication]. 
100. Id. at 247. 
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able systemic costs in legal uncertainty and other undesirable con­
sequences: 
The pragmatist thinks that what the judge is doing in deciding the 
nonroutine case is trying to come up wiih the most reasonable result 
in the circumstances, with due regard for such systemic constraints 
on the freewheeling employment of 'reason' as the need to maintain 
continuity with previous decisions and respect the limitations that 
the language and discernible purposes of constitutional and statutory 
texts impose on the interpreter.101 
The point of all this is to preserve some domain of policymaking 
discretion for judges, some field in which pragmatic judges can run 
free, bringing their all-things-considered consequentialist judg­
ments to bear on the parties before them. Posner is quite candid 
about this: 
[A]t their best American appellate courts are councils of wise elders 
and it is not completely insane to entrust them with responsibility for 
deciding cases in a way that will produce the best results in the cir­
cumstances rather than just deciding cases in accordance with rules 
created by other organs of government or in accordance with their 
own previous decisions, although that is what they will be doing most 
of the time.102 
It should be apparent that this distinction between case-specific 
consequences and systemic consequences, between the pragmatist 
maximand and the pragmatic side constraint, is illusory. The deci­
sion to license judges, in some domain, to interpret statutes. so as 
to maximize beneficial consequences in the case at hand is itself a 
system-level choice of a particular kind, a choice that will have 
system-level effects on the legislatures, agencies,' and litigants who 
must anticipate judges' efforts to sort ·cases from one domain to 
the other. Values must be attached to the relevant institutional 
variables; but the legal uncertainty, including decision and litiga­
tion costs, that the distinction creates might overwhelm the social 
benefits attainable in the class of cases that Posner would leave to 
freewheeling judicial discretion. So the questions are systemic all 
the way down, and Posner's distinction collapses on itself. 
If the distinction is illusory, it nonetheless has harmful effects. 
The very making of the distinction has real and unfortunate con­
sequences for Posner's account of adjudication generally and in­
terpretation in particular. The insistence, amounting to a faith, that 
there just has to be some domain of ep.tirely carefree discretion left 
IO I .  Richard A. Posner, J1ulges ' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. ·CHI .  
L. REV. 142 1 ,  1432-33 ( 1995). 
102. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 99. at 244. 
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to the wise elders of the benchio3 causes Posner to take a one-sided 
view of the empirical and institutional variaJ?les that a pragmatist 
would consider, if genuinely open minded about the possibility 
that interpretive formalism is pragmatically best for judges. 
An example is Posner's claim: that American judges have no 
choice but to assume the burdens of rulemaking and policymaking, 
because American legislatures (in contrast to Parliament and 
Continental legislatures) do not exercise sufficient oversight of the 
statutory system, do not correct gaps and resolve ambiguities at a 
sufficient rate, and thus leave t.he judges with no option but to 
amend statutes and fill statutory gaps through interpretation.u14 
The institutional analysis here is radically incomplete and perhaps 
mistaken. Posner offers no systematic analysis of the behavior of 
American legislatures; he does not show that the legislatiye failure 
is as pervasive as he suggests. But suppose that he is right. Even so, 
it might well be that the supposed irr�sponsibility of American 
legislatures is at least in part the result, not (as Posner assumes) 
the cause, of the relatively independent, policy-oriented approach 
to interpretation taken by American courts. Perhaps American 
legislatures opt for ambiguity and passivity, to the extent that they 
do, partly because the correctivist stance of American .courts 
ensures that underspecified or ill-considered legislation will in ef­
fect be supplemented or amended by judicial decisions. To know 
which of these stori�s is true, we would have to know the effects 
on legislatures of judicial formalism (or antiformalism); as a result 
we cannot rule out formalism as a strategy for American courts. 
Posner's claim that Amer:ican judges cannot be for.malist turns out 
to res� not on �vidence, but on intuition and an ungrounded, and 
highly contestable, causal theory about the dynamic interaction of 
legislatures and courts. . 
Our point is not that, when all of the relevant variables are 
considered, the pragmatic judge should be an interpretive formal­
ist. Our point is that Posner's attempt to treat systemic conse­
quences as merely a side-constraint on interpretation, despite its 
appearance of institutional sensitivity and hard-headedness, is just 
one more unsuccessful attempt to wall off institutional considera­
tions from interpretive theory. If this most consequentialist of 
theorists falls by the wayside, the problem of institutional insensi­
tivity is serious indeed. 
103. Our point here is not, of course, that all discretion can be squeezed out of in­
terpretation or adjudication, even in cases of real statutory ambiguity. Our point is that 
judicial discretion always has system-lev.el effects that judges should consider: there just 
is no domain of discretionary decisionmaking whose effects are confined entirely to the 
case at hand. · · 
· 
I 04. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, .mprll: note 99, at 250-51 .  
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II. FIRST-BEST, SECOND-BEST, AND RELEVANT QUESTIONS 
Thus far we have criticized a wide range of theorists for their 
failure to engage institutional issues. But there is an obvious objec­
tion to our emphasis on those issues. The objection takes this form: 
Is it useful, or even possible, to evaluate institutional variables 
without agreeing on a first-best theory? Without such a theory, we 
will be unable to know what counts as interpretive error. For some 
textualists, adherence to the text is simply the definition of a cor­
rect judgment; there is no independent measure of whether a judge 
has blundered. It is easy to imagine an advocate of purposive in­
terpretation, or of integrity,ios offering the same claim. Perhaps a 
judge proceeds correctly if and only if she puts the existing legal 
materials in the best constructive light. If this is so, what's the 
point of an institutional turn? Isn't it rudderless, or useful only as 
an adjunct to the first-best account? 
A. A Minimal Response 
Our minimal response to these questions is that without institu­
tional analysis, first-best accounts cannot yield any sensible conclu­
sions about interpretive rules. It is impossible to derive interpre­
tive rules directly from first-best principles, without answering 
second-best questions about institutional performance. Consider 
an analogy. In economics, the idea of second-best demonstrates 
that if perfect efficiency cannot be obtained, efficiency is not nec­
essarily maximized by approximating the first-best efficiency con­
ditions as closely as possible; the second-best outcome might, in 
principle, be obtained by departing from the first-best conditions 
in other respects as wen.106 So too, if an imperfect judge knows he 
will fal l  short of the standard of perfection defined by the reigning 
first-best account of interpretation, it is by no means clear that he 
should attempt to approximate or approach that standard as 
closely as possible. 
Suppose, for example, that we believe that the meaning of a 
statute should in principle be established by ascertaining the sub­
jective intentions of those who enacted it. It may nonetheless turn 
out that fallible judges ought not, simplemindedly, collect and ex­
amine as much evidence of subjective intentions as they can find. 
If the text supplies reliable evidence of intention, perhaps the best 
evidence, and if judges will mishandle other types of evidence, 
such as legislative history, perhaps restricting judges solely to the 
105. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 176-78. 
106. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
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text will increase the likelihood that the judges will accurately 
ascertain the legislators' intentions.107 Or suppose we believe that 
an ideal interpreter would not allow statutory texts to produce ab­
surd results, results not possibly intended by a rational legislator. 
From this it does not fol low that the interpretive rules should li­
cense real judges to prevent unintended absurdity. If judges will 
often see absurdity when it isn't really present, simply because 
they misunderstand the substantive policies in play, then allowing 
them to attempt to correct absurdity might do more harm than 
good; perhaps they should not make that inquiry at all. 
These examples illustrate that, at the very least, institutional 
analysis is necessary, even if not sufficient, to an adequate evalua­
tion of interpretive methods. It is of course true, in these examples, 
that some first-best account is needed in order to define j udicial 
error. Our minimal point is that the first-best account, taken by 
itself, is necessarily incomplete. It is impossible to derive interpre­
tive rules directly from the first-best account, because institutional 
considerations always intervene. An intentionalist account of stat­
utes' authority, by itself, tells us nothing about whether real judges 
should consult or not consult legislative history; a theoretical 
injunction to avoid absurd outcomes, by itself, tell us nothing 
about whether real judges should be licensed to use an absurd­
results doctrine. In any of these settings, certain findings about in­
stitutional capacities might cause the proponent of the first-best 
account either to adopt or reject the interpretive doctrine in ques­
tion. Theory without institutional analysis spins its wheels, unable 
to gain traction on the question of what interpretive rules real­
world judges should use. 
B. Bypassing First-Best Disagreements? Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements on Interpretive Practices 
But we would go further. A second-best assessment of institu­
tional issues might, in some cases, be not only necessary but indeed 
sufficient to resolve conflicts over interpretive theories, simply 
because the assessment might lead people with different views on 
the theoretical issues to agree on the appropriate practices. For 
example, intentionalists disagree sharply with textualists, at least 
about the right foundation for interpretation. But they agree on a 
great deal, and most of the time their disagreements are quite ir­
relevant to their resolution of cases. Both agree that the statutory 
text is the starting point for interpretation, and both accept the 
107. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial 
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1 862-77 
(1998). 
915 
916 Michigan Law Review lVol. 1 01:885 
view that ·courts should not lightly depart from the text, which 
most intentionalists see as strong evidence of intentions. On the 
current Court, textualists are often able to join opinions written by 
intentionalists, and vice versa.w8 And given certain empirical and 
institutional assumptions, both the intentionalist and the textualist 
might even be able to agree upon a rule excluding legislative his­
tory. The intentionalist would agree because, on particular empiri­
cal premises, the rule would minimize both erroneous determina­
tions of legislative intent and the costs of litigation. The textualist 
would agree because, on the same premises, the rule would mini­
mize erroneous determinations of ordinary textual meaning and 
litigation costs. This · consensus would be · in the nature of an 
incompletely theorized agreement:1()<J interpreters holding different 
theories of authority might, in this way, be enabled to converge on 
particular doctrines. 
There are many possible examples. In a legal system in which 
legislators generally corrected absurd outcomes, and in which judi­
cial use of the absurd-results canon was abused to fit with judicial 
policy preferences� most people would be skeptical of that. canon. 
But if absurd outcomes are uncorrected in some domain, and if 
courts are careful to apply the canon only in clear cases, what tex­
tualist should object?1 10 Indeed, institutional analysis might even 
enable interpreters to choose particular doctrines before, or in 
place of, choosing a theory of authority. If, on certain empirical 
findings, it turned out that legislative history should be excluded 
on any theory of the proper aims of interpretation, then as far as 
that doctrinal question goes there would be no need to choose a 
fundamental theory. . 
So it is uncontroversial that talk of judicial mistakes, and insti­
tutional analysis generally, presupposes some underlying, first-best 
account of interpretation. But the point doesn't cut very deeply, 
nor does it contravene any of our claims. What modern interpre­
tive theory has largely overlooked is that institutional analysis is a 
necessary condition for choosing interpretive domains, even if it is 
not a sufficient condition. And in some dornaiils, it may indeed be 
a sufficient condition. It is simply a logical blunder to suppose that 
interpreters must agree upon some particular theory of authority 
108. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 ( 1990); Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 ( 1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
1 09. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1 733 (1995). 
1 10. It is noteworthy in this regard that Justice Scalia, the leading textualist on the 
Court, accepts the idea that absurd outcomes, not reasonably taken as part of 
Congress's instructions, should not be allowed even if they seem to follow from statu­
tory text. See Green, 490 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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in order to agree upon interpretive doctrines. Where an overlap­
ping consensus or incompletely theorized agreement is possible, 
interpreters may choose rules while bracketing, and remaining 
agnostic about, first-best accounts. Of course the scope or size of 
the domain in which such agreement is possible remains uncertain. 
But that is just one more empirical question for institutional analy­
sis to answer. 
C. Relevant Questions 
Let us conclude this section. by isolating the ingredients of that 
analysis, by focussing on the issues, mostly empirical, that must be 
explored by those evaluating formalism in various legal' systems 
and various domains of law. 
• The first question, suggested above, is whether and 
when formalist decisions that produce clear mistakes 
will be corrected by the legislature and whether 
making the corrections will have low or high costs. 
Undoubtedly this question will have different an­
swers in different circumstances. We know far too 
little to know how to answer it in the United States. 
Is the New York legislature, for example, different 
on this count from the legislatures of California and 
Missouri? It would be highly desirable to know 
much more about the interpretive practices of 
courts in different states, and to make some evalua­
tion of the different solutions. We might be able, for 
example, to find state courts that are . especially 
unwilling to make exceptions in cases of evident 
absurdity - and we might be able to see whether 
courts of this kind have produced outcomes that 
have remained legislatively uncorrected. We might 
also ask whether legislatures are more or less likely 
· to oversee anc1 fix judicial decision:s that attempt to 
follow statutory text. 
A similar inquiry might proceed by comparing 
judicial and legislative behavior in different domains 
of substantive law. Perhaps Congress is unlikely 
to police judicial decisions interpreting the Adminis­
trative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Sherman 
Act; perhaps Congress is entirely willing to oversee 
judicial decisions in the are!!S of tax and bankruptcy. 
If so, different judicial approaches might be sensible 
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in the different areas.1 1 1  Where Congress is inatten­
tive and appears to rely on courts for long periods of 
time, an irreverent judicial approach to statutory 
text might be defensible. Where Congress will cor­
rect judicial errors fairly costlessly, formalism is 
easier to justify. People with different first-best 
theories might well accept these suggestions. Does 
American practice, in various domains, suggest that 
courts are less formal where Congress is less atten­
tive? It would be highly desirable to know. Here 
there is a large set of empirical projects. 
• The second question is whether a nonformalist judi­
ciary will greatly increase the costs of decision for 
courts, litigants, and those seeking legal advice. A 
large issue here involves planning; if nonformal 
approaches make planning difficult or impossible, 
there is a real problem.112 Some areas have a greater 
demand for planning than others, and hence it 
might be predicted that courts will perceive them­
selves as most constrained when planning is neces­
sary. We might expect that the basic rules governing 
disposition of estates will require a good deal of 
clarity, and that in view of considerations of fair 
notice, many courts will be reluctant to interpret 
criminal statutes flexibly to cover c;:riminal defen­
dants. 1 13 Is this true? Are generalizations possible 
about the circumstances in which nonformalism is 
especially unsettling? 
• The third question is whether a formalist or 
nonformalist judiciary, in one or another domain, 
will produce mistakes and injustices. Of course peo­
ple might dispute the content of these categories. 
One person's error might be another's fidelity to 
Jaw. But the extent of social disagreement should 
[Vol. 101:885 
111 . Of course, no simple algorithm can say whether Congress is attentive; in some 
contexts, reasonable people might disagree about that question. But it is clear that in 
some contexts, Congress rarely addresses judicial practices, whereas in others, such 
practices are an object of careful attention. The interpretation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act falls in the first category; the interpretation of the Internal Revenue 
Code falls in the second. 
112. For a nuanced treatment of the effects of formalism on planning costs in tax 
law, suggesting that formalism might increase planning costs by encouraging strategic 
behavior, see David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 
(1999). 
113. Note that the rule of lenity, calling for courts to interpret statutes favorably to 
criminal defendants, can be understood as an outgrowth of the fair notice concern. 
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not be overstated here. It is easy to imagine cases in 
which courts have used background purposes, not to 
make sense of the law, but to impose their own 
views about sound policy.1 14 We could know far 
more than we now do about whether state or fed­
eral courts have done well or poorly when they have 
consulted purposes, attempted to avoid absurdities, 
or invoked background principles within the legal 
system. One empirical project would involve com­
parisons among the courts of different states, to see 
if large differences can be found in interpretive be­
havior. It might also be useful to investigate why dif­
ferences among state courts might exist, either ex­
plicitly in canons of construction or implicitly in 
decisions themselves. For example, the size and 
complexity of government in states like New York 
or California might cut in one direction, while a less 
populous or more compact state might take a differ­
ent position simply because the legislature has a 
greater ability to anticipate and solve problems as 
they arise. Another such project would involve 
·comparisons over time to see if courts have changed 
from formalist to nonformalist approaches, or vice 
versa, and to see the antecedents and consequences 
of such shifts. 
We do not suggest that these empirical projects would be sim­
ple to execute,115 or that they would lead to uncontroversial nor­
mative recommendations. Our central claims are that first-best 
theories are incomplete without an acknowledgement of the im­
portance of the questions just identified, and that it is not possible 
to deduce, from large claims about legitimacy or authority, an an­
swer to the reasonably disputed questions of interpretive choice. 
Precisely because the empirical study of interpretation remains in 
an extremely primitive state, there is every reason to think that 
much will be gained by further empirical efforts. 
114. See the references in note 116, infra, which address this issue in the context of 
the development of pre-New Deal case law. 
115. A good model is provided by INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (D. Neil MacCorrnick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). The leading study 
of congressional overrulings of judicial interpretations is William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991), 
and a great deal might be done to build on Eskridge's findings. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
In the foregoing we have argued for something akin to an insti­
tutional turn in interpretive theory. What reforms of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation would such a turn counsel, if it were 
accomplished'? What changes might it produce in public law, if im­
plemented'? Here we will sketch, lightly, some possible · implica­
tions of a resolutely institutional approach to statutory interpreta­
tion by courts (Section A), statutory interpretation by agencies 
(Section B), and constitutional interpretation by courts (Section 
C). Our aim, as throughout, is not to defend any particular sub­
stantive approach to interpretation, but to show how the institu­
tional lens refocuses the relevant questions. 
A. Formalism and Empiricism 
Implicit in much of Part II was the straightforward idea that in­
terpretive formalism might best be defended on empirical and in­
stitutional grounds. Here we will amplify that idea by indicating 
the line of argument that such a defense would have to take. We 
will focus on courts and legislatures, bracketing important ques­
tions about agency interpretation and judicial interpretation in a 
world of agencies, questions taken. up in Section B. 
A good beginning is to distinguish two senses of the protean 
word "formalism." In one sense, formalism refers to a type of justi­
fication for legal rulings or doctrines, namely a conceptualistic or 
essentialist justification. For a large-scale example, consider the 
Langdellian claim that law, properly so-called, must necessarily be 
organized by deduction from self-evident first principles. For a 
small-scale example, consider the Supreme Court's occasional 
embrace of conceptualistic jurisprudence in constitutional law, 
such as the essentialist distinction between "manufacturing" and 
"commerce," 1 1 6  or between "legislative" and "executive" power. 1 17 
In a very different sense, explicated by Frederick Schauer 
among others,1 18 formalism refers to a particular decisionmaking 
strategy that courts might follow. Here courts make a second-
116. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). On the similarities and 
differences between Langdellian formalism and the formalism of the pre-New Deal 
Court, see Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 6-9, at http:/lpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=200732. 
1 17. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 ( 1983). 
118. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); see 
also Grey, supra note 116, at 4 (identifying a strand of formalism that emphasizes rule 
following and legal determinacy). 
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order decision1 1 9  to decide cases, where possible, according to rules 
rather than standards, placing great emphasis upon the value of 
legal certainty and the value of adhering to common understand­
ings of constitutional and statutory commands. On this account, a 
judicial preference for formalist decisionmaking need not and 
cannot rest upoi:i a deduction from any superior source of princi­
ples, such as the Constitution or some definition of law's essence. 
Formalism is justified, if at all, by reference to a claim that forma.1-
ism will improve the legal system in relevant respects, with 
improvement defined by reference to social goods exterior to law 
itself. 
After the institutional turn, we will say, formalism in the 
second sense can be seen as a potentially sensible decisionmaking 
strategy for courts interpreting statutes. Formalism in this sense 
would counsel that courts stick close to the surface meaning of 
texts, where possible, and place great emphasis on promoting, ex 
ante, the clarity of legal commands and the intelligibility of the 
default rules against which legislatures must draft statutes in the 
first instance. The formalist judge would generally decline to at­
tempt to mold statutes to fit their purposes or intentions, would 
hesitate to declare the apparent import of statutory text "absurd," 
and would narrow the range of outside sources admissible to 
impeach textual meanings. It is no objection to formalism, so con­
ceived, to parrot the banality that texts are "clear" only by refer­
ence to the practices of some linguistic community. That is cer­
tainly true, but it doesn't mean that no text is clear.120 If so, then 
courts might choose to be formalists, not by pretending that all 
texts are self-interpreting in some context-free sense, but on good 
consequentialist grounds, thinking that things will be better if 
courts emphasize the surface or apparent meaning of texts (as con­
stituted by relevant assumptions and practices), rather than 
impeaching them by reference to other sources and considerations. 
The significance of the institutional turn, on this view, is just to 
make clear that formalism in the second, operational sense cannot 
itself be justified by formalism in the first, justificatory sense. For­
malism cannot be justified (or opposed) by an appeal to self­
evident constitutional principles, to the nature of democracy or 
lawmaking, or to a definition of law. Conversely, however, for­
malism as a decisionmaking strategy in statutory interpretation, or 
for that matter in any other setting, can be justified or opposed 
1 19. See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 1 10 
ETHICS 5 (1999). 
120. See Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 96, at 191 ("No text is clear except in 
terms of a linguistic and cultural environment, but it doesn't follow that no text is 
clear."). 
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(solely) on the basis of a forward-looking assessment of the conse­
quences of the competing alternatives. Just as Manning errs by ar­
guing for formalism by reference to formal sources, so Eskridge 
errs by engaging Manning on the same terrain in order to oppose 
formalism.121 The correct ground for opposing formalism is that 
antiformalism will produce better consequences for public law 
than formalism. 
Why might it be true (or false) that formalism in the second 
sense would be the best interpretive method for courts to follow? 
What would we have to know about the consequences of the com­
peting alternatives to know whether courts should subscribe to 
formalism? The variables are numerous, but can be herded into 
two large categories: the performance of the interpreting judges, 
and the systemic effects of the judges' interpretive rules on other 
actors. The former category subsumes the costs of mistaken 
rulings, of Type I and Type II errors, and also the costs of 
decisionmaking itself. The latter category subsumes a ·range of 
questions about the effect of the judiciary's interpretive rules on 
legislative drafting costs and the costs of administrative rulemak­
ing, on citizens' and agencies' compliance with law, and on the be­
havior of other courts, including both lower courts and future 
courts at the same level of the legal hierarchy. . 
A commitment to interpretive formalism, in the operational 
sense, would follow from particular views about the values of these 
two (classes of) variables. On a dim assessment of the performance 
of interpreting judges, for example, interpretive formalism will 
appear more attractive than antiformalism. Relevant here are 
many questions about the manageability of alternative interpretive 
sources, such as legislative history and canons of construction, and 
about the limits of judicial information. A court interpreting under 
tight constraints of time and information may do better to ignore 
or subordinate interpretive sources, like legislative history, whose 
large volume and unfamiliar components could often provoke ju­
dicial error. For similar reasons a court staffed by generalist judges 
might do better, all else equal, by sticking to the apparent or 
common meaning of texts and by eschewing empirically ambitious 
innovations in statutory policy. A specialized court, by contrast, 
would often do better with antiformalist interpretive techniques 
that give free play to the court's superior appreciation of legisla­
tive intentions, interest group deals, statutory policies, and social 
and economic consequences. Here an important institutional com­
plication, needing detailed study, is the existence of specialized 
courts or judges whose decisions are reviewed by generalist 
121 .  For a recap of this debate, see supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text 
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judges.122 {In Section B we will argue, along the same lines, that 
specialist administrative agencies might often wield nontextualist 
interpretive techniques more successfully than generalist courts; 
specialized courts are an intermediate case). 
So too, interpretive formalism will look more attractive on cer­
tain empirical assumptions about feedback effects on legislative 
behavior, or system effects more generally. Suppose that judicial 
formalism would produce more careful legislative drafting, 
ex ante, and would encourage the development of corrective 
mechanisms, ex post, such as the "Corrections Day" procedure re­
cently instituted by the House of Representatives.123 These possi­
bilities are the ones overlooked by Posner in his claim that the 
sloppiness of American legislatures requires American courts to 
adopt an antiformalist stance.124 It is possible that the effects run in 
the other direction; to the extent that they do, formalism should be 
preferred as the approach that will push the interpretive system, 
taken as a whole, in desirable directions. 
Law professors, who are usually highly specialized in some par­
ticular field or other, often miss these points about the limited 
competence of generalist judges.125 It is very common to see a law 
professor complaining that some generalist court has blundered in 
its latest interpretation of the specialized statute that the professor 
has made a career of studying; usually the blunder occurs because 
the court has, in the critic's view, interpreted "woodenly," 
"mechanically," or "formalistically," with insufficient attention to 
history, policy, and nuance. In such cases there is a kind of selec­
tion bias in play. By interpreting woodenly, sticking close to ap­
parent meaning, the court increases the risk of one sort of error 
(the sort the critic castigates). But the court decreases the risk of 
another, opposite sort of error - the error that an intellectually 
ambitious antiformalist court would make by misreading statutory 
purposes, misidentifying sensible text as absurd, or mispredicting 
122. An example is bankruptcy; for some helpful sources, see Karen M. 
Gebbia-Pinelli, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173 (2000). 
1 23. See John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996). 
124. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 99. 
125. See, e.g. , Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 122, at 297 ("Advocates, lower court 
judges, and bankruptcy scholars can, and should, help the Court better understand the 
music of the Bankruptcy Code" through "thoughtfully written briefs, opinions. and law 
review articles that place the text of disputed Bankruptcy Code provisions in the 
context of the linguistic and substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code" and "place 
the text in the context of the development of bankruptcy doctrine over time."). For a 
sophisticated exposition of the costs and benefits of formalist interpretation by gener­
alist judges in a specialized area, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's 
Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 SUP. Cr. REV. 393. 
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the consequences of its rulings.126 Where courts are more often 
formalist than not, the law professor rarely sees that kind of error 
and rarely complains about it. 
There is a useful analogy to ethics here. The choice between in­
terpretive formalism and antiformalism has some of the same 
intellectual structure as the choice between rule-utilitarianism and 
act-utilitarianism. The rule-utilitarian will often be placed in the 
awkward position of defending acts whose immediate effect is, 
when viewed in isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it is the 
easiest thing in the world for law professors to mention specific 
cases in which formalism produces blunders, relative to a nuanced 
antiformalism that is sensitive to the particulars of cases. In both 
legal and ethical settings, however, the second-order, rule-based 
decisionmaking strategies look more appealing where the deci­
sionmaker cannot be trusted to identify socially beneficial acts or 
appealing conceptions of statutory purpose. 
Our emphasis on institutional considerations derives some 
support from comparing interpretation in England with that in the 
United States.127 In England, interpretation is far more rigid than 
in the United States. The British Parliament is less likely to 
delegate discretionary authority to judges. For their part, English 
judges tend to treat statutes as rules, generally refusing to investi­
gate whether the particular application of the rule makes sense as 
a matter of policy or principle. Institutional differences help 
explain the situation. In England, drafting is done by an Office 
of Parliamentary Counsel, a highly professional body with 
considerable experience in ensuring against inadvertent mistakes. 
The Parliamentary Counsel attempts to prom.qte a uniform style of 
drafting. The Counsel is also closely attuned to the . method.s of 
English judges. The judges' practice is itself uniform and relatively 
simple. Parliament revisits statutes with some fryquency, and it 
fixes mistakes that are shown as such when particular cases arise. 128 
In the United States, by contrast, there is no centralized draft­
ing body and hence less uniformity in terminology. There is less 
professionalization in the production of statutes. The drafters of 
legislation are multiple and uncoordinated. Congress appears only 
1 26. Here we are eliding many questions about the internal design of the judicial 
system. The availability of appeals might, in principle. either deter or encourage error 
by trial courts. These issues are precisely the sort that we want to put on the agenda of 
interpretive theory. 
1 27. We draw in this Section on P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND 
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL 
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY. AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ( 1 987). 
1 28. We are here generalizing, and eliding a great deal of important detail. The 
English courts, for example, in the recent past abandoned their traditional practice of 
refusing to consult Parliamentary history. See Pepper v. Hart, I All E.R. 42 (1993). 
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intermittently aware of the judges' interpretive practices, which 
are themselves not easy to describe in light of the sheer size of the 
federal judiciary and the existence of sharp splits, on just this 
point, within the Supreme Court. It would be wrong to say that 
Congress is oblivious to judicial decisions interpreting statutes. 129 
But Congress is not in the business of responding rapidly and 
regularly to particular cases in which interpretations, literal or 
otherwise, tend to misfire. Hence both lawmaking and law­
interpreting practice are very different here from in England. 
This brief description connects well with the suggestion that 
the case for formalism depends on institutional competence and on 
empirical matters. Roughly speaking, the English lawmaking sys­
tem displays active, professionalized legislative oversight and a 
formalist judiciary, while the American lawmaking system is dif­
ferent on both counts. None of this suggests that institutional ca­
pacities are somehow irrevocably fixed in the two countries, or 
that American courts must necessarily adopt an antif ormalist 
stance. That is the mistaken view that Richard Posner advances; as 
we have seen, his view overlooks the possibility that institutional 
capacities might themselves be affected by the interpretive rules 
courts use, so that the adoption of a formalist stanc� by American 
courts might spur American legislatures to increased activity.130 
The important point is just that the two legal systems are highly re­
sponsive to their own distinctive institutions. The debate over in­
terpretive formalism turns, most critically, on the structure of the 
lawmaking system rather than on claims about the nature of com­
munication, democracy, or jurisprudential principles. 
B. Agencies and Courts 
The Chevron question. How shoul<;l courts approach agency in­
terpretations of law? Should courts decide legal questions on their 
own, or should they give some weight to the views of the relevant 
agency? For many years the answer to this question was sharply 
disputed. It received an authoritative answer in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc. ,131 which sets out a 
two-step inquiry. Under step one, the question is whether 
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," or 
1 29. See Eskridge, Dynamic Swtutory Interpretation, supra note 75, at 1 530-33 
(noting that, for political reasons, Congress may eschew clarity in statutory drafting and 
rely on the courts to provide the necessary clarifying interpretations). 
1 30. The switch would itself produce transition costs, to be netted against the bene­
fits of the new regime. This is the sort of institutional variable that the style of analysis 
we urge would take into account. 
1 3 1 .  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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whether Congress has unambiguously banned what the agency 
proposes to do.132 Under step two, courts ask whether the agency's 
interpretation of the statute is "based on a permissible construc­
tion of the statute."133 The result is that under Chevron, agency in­
terpretations of law should be upheld if they are reasonable and if 
they do not contradict the clear instructions of Congress. The court 
is not authorized to reject the agency's interpretation merely be­
cause of disagreement. 
How is Chevron to be evaluated? It is generally agreed that 
courts must follow congressional instructions on the question of 
deference - that if Congress has unambiguously instructed courts 
to defer to agency interpretations of law, or not to do so, courts 
must do as Congress says.134 With this premise, many people have 
defended Chevron, or challenged Chevron, by reference to 
enacted Jaw. Some urge, for example, that the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which asks courts to "decide relevant questions of 
law,"135 argues in favor of an independent judicial judgment on the 
legal question. But on reflection, statutory law is generally inde­
terminate on the crucial question. To be sure, courts are told to 
decide relevant questions of law; but under statutes in which agen­
cies are exercising delegated authority, perhaps the meaning of the 
relevant law is what agencies say that it is. At the very least, this is 
a plausible reading of statutes that delegate rulemaking and adju­
dicative authority to agencies. Plausible, but not necessary; candid 
observers, on all sides, acknowledge that Congress has not authori­
tatively required or forbidden the Chevron principle.136 
We think that the best defenses of Chevron attempt to read 
ambiguous congressional instructions in a way that is well-attuned 
to institutional considerations. As the simplest illustration, con­
sider Peter Strauss's defense of Chevron. 137 Strauss emphasizes 
that the Supreme Court is able to resolve a small percentage of 
cases involving ambiguities in regulatory law. He suggests that 
because of the sheer number of courts of appeals, independent ju­
dicial interpretations of regulatory law would make it extremely 
difficult to ensure national uniformity. If Chevron is followed 
1 32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
1 33. Id. at 843. 
134. See generally Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. l (1983). 
135. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2000). 
1 36. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 51 1 .  
137. Peter Strauss, One f-111ndred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some lmplicatiol!S of the 
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1093 { 1 987). 
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faithfully, agency interpretations will be authoritative unless there 
has been clear error; and this means that if the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC"), or the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB") interprets its governing statute in a particular way, 
national law is likely to be genuinely national. If Chevron were not 
the law, and were not followed faithfully, it is inevitable that regu­
latory law - involving, for example, the environment, communica­
tions, and labor-management relations - will be highly variable 
across the country. Chevron therefore works against balkanization 
of federal Jaw. 
This consideration need not be decisive. But other institutional 
points are relevant. The resolution of statutory ambiguities must, 
in many cases, depend on judgments of fact and value. Does the 
word "source," as used in the Clean Air Act, refer to particular 
smoke stacks or to plants?138 Does the word "harm," as used in the 
Endangered Species Act, refer to intentional or reckless killings, 
or destruction of habitat as well?139 It is reasonable to think that by 
virtue of their specialized competence and relative accountability, 
agencies are in a better position to make these decisions than 
courts. 
In making this suggestion, we mean to draw attention to two 
ways of analyzing the Chevron problem. The first, and perhaps the 
most common, is to speak in terms of constitutional considera­
tions, separation of powers,140 and congressional instructions. We 
agree that if any of these were clear, the question would be at an 
end. But here, as in many other contexts, the relevant sources of 
law do not resolve the choice of interpretive rules. The second way 
of analyzing Chevron is frankly institutional. Our submission here 
is that the institutional arguments, however they might be 
resolved, are the best way to think about the problem. 
This submission has broader implications as well. For example, 
consider the recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,141 
which grants Chevron deference to all products of rulemaking and 
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837-40. 
139. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 
(1995). 
140. The most obvious idea here includes the nondelegation doctrine, forbidding 
Congress from granting open-ended discretionary power to administrative agencies. 
One of us has argued that Chevron is in tension with the nondelegation doctrine, 
because it increases the discretionary power of agencies. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constit11tionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 , 468 (1987). On the other 
hand, Sunstein no longer believes this, and Vermeule thinks that the Constitution con­
tains no nondelegation principle. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.  L. REV. 1721 (2002). 
141. 533 U.S. 218 (2001 ). 
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formal adjudication, but which uses a complex, multifaceted analy­
sis to determine whether Chevron applies in other circumstances. 
The institutional perspective raises the possibility that Mead might 
be wrong, not because Congress intends otherwise, but because 
the institutional variables call for deference where Mead .refuses it. 
Suppose that lower courts and litigants struggle with Mead, ap­
plying the new framework clumsily because it combines rules and 
standards in confusing ways; or suppose that the additional deci­
sion costs attributable to Mead come to appear extremely high, in 
that lower courts spend a great deal of time on complicated pre­
liminary questions about deference, even in cases whose merits are 
easy one way or another.142 Given these or similar findings, Mead 
would appear hard to defend, quite apart from one's views on the 
contested questions of high interpretive theory. 
A simple submission. Now let us link two parts of the discus­
sion thus far. Suppose we conclude that for many American courts, 
much of the time, some form of textualism is the best approach to 
statutory interpretation. Suppose that we also conclude that 
Chevron is correct. Must agencies be textualists? This question has 
no clear answer under current law. We urge here that attention to 
institutional considerations can show why agencies might be given 
the authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be 
denied that authority. 
Two points are relevant here. First, agencies are likely to be in 
a better position to decide whether departures from the text 
actually make sense. This is so mostly because agencies have a 
superior degree of technical competence; but it is not irrelevant 
that agencies are subject to a degree of democratic supervision.143 
Second, agencies are likely to be in a better position to know 
whether departures from the text will seriously diminish predict­
ability or otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme. If agencies are 
not concerned about the risk of unsettlement, there is some reason 
to think that the risk is low. Our suggestion is that because of these 
points, the case for formalistic interpretation from judges might 
well be stronger than the case for formalistic interpretation by 
agencies. 
In fact, a number of decisions seem to show an implicit agree­
ment with this point. The leading case is American Water Works 
1 42. For a study suggesting that these possibilities in fact describe the D.C. Circuit's 
performance after Mead, see Adrian Vermeule, Introduction to the Annual Review of 
the D. C. Circuit: Mead in the Trenches, Tl GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
1 43. Much of this supervision comes from the President. See JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC 
LAW 1 52-56 ( 1 997). 
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Ass'n v. EPA.144 The case involved a creative approach by the 
EPA to the regulation of lead in drinking water. The Safe 
Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to produce maximum con­
taminant level goals ("MCLG") for water contaminants.145 These 
goals must "be set at the level at which no known or anticipated 
adverse effects on the health of persons occur," with an adequate 
margin of safety.146 The EPA's MCLG for lead was zero, because 
no safe threshold had been established. Once an MCLG is estab­
lished, the EPA is required to set a maximum contaminant level 
("MCL"), "as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as is 
feasible."147 The EPA is authorized not to set a maximum con­
taminant level, and to require "the use of a treatment technique in 
lieu of establishing" that level, if (and only if) it finds "that it is not 
economically or technologically feasible to ascertain the level of 
the contaminant. "148 
For lead, then, the EPA would be expected to set its MCL as 
close as "feasible" (economically and technologically) to the 
MCLG of zero, except if it was not "feasible" to ascertain the level 
of lead contamination (and no one urged that the task of ascer­
tainment was not feasible). But this is not what the EPA did, be­
cause of some distinctive features of the lead problem. Source 
water is basically lead-free; the real problem comes from corrosion 
of service lines and plumbing materials. With this point in mind, 
the EPA refused to set any MCL for lead. The EPA reasoned that 
an MCL would require public water systems to µse extremely 
aggressive corrosion control techniques, which, while economically 
and technologically "feasible," would be counterproductive, be­
cause they would increase the level of other contaminants in the 
water. What appeared to be the legally mandated solution would 
make the water less safe, not more so. The EPA therefore chose a 
more subtle and modest approach. Instead of issuing an MCL, it 
required all large water systems to institute certain corrosion con­
trol treatment, and required smaller systems to do so if and only if 
representative sampling found significant lead contamination. 
The EPA did not contend that an MCL was not "feasible" to 
implement, nor did it argue that it was not "feasible," in the eco­
nomic or technological sense, to monitor lead levels in water. 
Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency's decision.149 The court 
144. 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
145. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l (b) (2000). 
1 46. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b)(4)(A). 
147. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(4)(B). 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b){7){A). 
149. American Water Works, 40 F.3d at 127 1 .  
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accepted the EPA 's seemingly implausible suggestion that the 
word "feasible" could be construed to mean "capable of being ac­
complished in a manner consistent with the Act."150 The court said 
that the "case law is replete with examples of statutes the ordinary 
meaning of which is not necessarily what the Congress intended," 
and it added, pointedly and controversially, that "where a literal 
meaning of a statutory term would lead to absurd results," that 
term "has no plain meaning."151 Because an MCL would itself lead 
to more contamination, "it could lead to a result squarely at odds 
with the purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act."152 
The court therefore accepted the EPA's view "that requiring 
public water systems to design and implement custom corrosion 
control plans for lead will result in optimal treatment of drinking 
water overall, i.e. treatment that deals adequately with lead 
without causing public water systems to violate drinking water 
regulations for other contaminants."153 It should be plain that the 
court permitted a quite surprising, and even countertextual, inter­
pretation of the Act. The statutory terms seem to make no room 
for the EPA's refusal to issue an MCL. In upholding the EPA's re­
fusal, the court authorized the agency to avoid an unreasonable 
result. 
Qualifications. We believe that agencies should not be required 
to interpret statutes in the same way as courts; but any judgment 
on this point itself depends on contextual factors. If, for example, 
Congress would immediately and costlessly correct the problems 
that would be produced by formalism, then there would be much 
less need to allow interpretations of the kind upheld in American 
Water Works. In a legal universe where Congress can be expected 
to correct the problem in that case - if it is indeed a problem -
the pressure for agency correction would be greatly reduced. And 
there are other possible problems. Suppose that, in a world not so 
very different from our own, agencies are systematically distrusted, 
in part because they' are not technically expert after all, in part be­
cause they are highly susceptible to the power of self-interested 
private groups that move agency decisions in predictable direc­
tions. In such a world, the argument for purposive agency interpre­
tation, in the face of statutory text, would be very weak. And in 
fact it is not difficult to imagine a legal system in which courts are, 
and should be, authorized to engage in purposive interpretation, 
1 50. Id. at 1270. 
151. Id. at 1271 .  
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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and in which agencies must follow the text unless courts specifi­
cally instruct them not to do so. 
With these points we are able to have a better understanding of 
some continuing disputes about judicial review of agency action. 
Notwithstanding American Water Works and similar decisions,154 a 
number of cases insist that agencies adhere closely to statutory 
text. If these outcomes are to be defended, it must be with an ex­
pectation that Congress will correct the resulting problems, or with 
a belief that agencies, authorized to depart from text, will move 
regulatory law in undesirable directions. 
Another contextual and empirical factor to consider is whether 
a regime of purposive interpretation by agencies and textualist 
interpretation by courts would be stable. We might imagine, 
pessimistically, that the anticipation of judicial review by textualist 
courts would cause agencies to adopt textualist methods, simply to 
maximize the chances of having their decisions sustained; agencies' 
authority to depart from textualism would then become strictly 
nominal. If so, it would provide a reason, all else equal, for courts 
and agencies to adopt the same interpretive approach, although we 
would still face the important choice between across-the-board 
textualism or across-the-board purposivism. But we might also 
imagine, more optimistically, that reviewing courts would defer to 
agencies' adoption of a purposive interpretive style, even if the 
same courts would adopt a textualist approach when deciding 
cases with no agency in the picture. Chevron, after all, can easily 
be understood to allow the agency some latitude to choose be­
tween interpretive approaches and to vary from the approach the 
court itself would adopt. In this scenario, the agency would have 
no need to mimic the judges' own interpretive approach, so a 
regime of agency purposivism and judicial textualism would not be 
excessively unstable. These possibilities, like the considerations 
above, exemplify the sort of institutional questions that a fully 
developed analysis of agency interpretation must ask. 
A rbitrariness and ossification: a final note on administrative law. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts are required to 
set aside agency action that is "arbitrary" or "capricious."155 But 
what do these terms mean? How should courts try to answer that 
question? For much of the modern period of administrative law, 
the answer has come from accounts of "agency failure."156 Drawing 
154. See, e.g. , Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing 
agency power to consider costs); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. 
<;;ir. 1 979) (recognizing agency power to make de minimis exceptions). 
1 55. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2000). 
156. See Michael B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
H ARV. L. REV. 1 667, 1684-87 ( 1 975). 
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attention to administrative susceptibility to powerful private 
groups, many critics, both on and off the federal bench, have en­
dorsed the idea that courts should take a "hard look" at agency ac­
tion, in order to reduce factional influences and promote better 
policymaking.157 
What has been ignored, for much of the life of the resulting 
debate, are two sets of risks. The first involves judicial error, partly 
a product of sheer ignorance. 158 The second and more fundamental 
involves systemic effects, above all in the form of large-scale 
alterations in administrative behavior, produced by the very fact of 
"hard look" review. It is now well-documented that such review 
has contributed to the "ossification" of notice-and-comment rule­
making, which now takes years, in part as a result of the effort to 
fend off judicial challenges. In light of the risk of invalidation, 
many agencies have turned away from notice-and-comment rule­
making altogether - with the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration ("NHTSA"), for example, attempting to promote 
automobile safety through ex post recalls, which is generally re­
garded as a senseless way to proceed. Our claim here is that the 
analysis of "hard look" review is ludicrously incomplete if it does 
not pay attention to institutional considerations of this kind. And 
indeed, some of the most impressive work in administrative law 
attempts to incorporate judicial fallibility and dynamic effects into 
ap account of how to assess whether agency action counts as "arbi­
trary" under the AP A.159 
C. Constitutional Interpretation 
Overview. Our principal recommendation has been that inter­
pretive theory in legislation and administrative law should take an 
institutional turn. What of constitutional interpretation? Here we 
will say that academic theory about constitutional law does far bet­
ter, on the score of institutional sensitivity, than academic theory 
about statutory interpretation. Constitutional theorists have, in 
part, already taken the institutional turn, with important work be­
ginning in the 1970s. At the same time, the turn is as yet incom­
plete and has not been explicitly recognized as such; the treatment 
of basic questions in constitutional law, such as judicial review, has 
1 57. See, e.g. , Note, Judicial Control of Systematic Inadequacies in Federal 
Administrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407 (1978). 
1 58. See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear 
Energy Controversy, 9 1  HARV. L. REV. 1833 {1978). 
1 59. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HAFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY { 1 990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 59 ( 1995). 
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always suffered from institutional blindness, and there remain im­
portant pockets of contemporary theory that are resolutely oblivi­
ous to second-best questions. 
We will begin by emphasizing the extent to which the founda­
tions of interpretive theory in constitutional law are deficient on 
the score of institutional sensitivity. Here the critical case is, of 
course, Marbury v. Madison1w and its inadequate (because exces­
sively abstract and conceptual) justification for judicial review. 
After sketching the partial and salutary tum to institutional analy­
sis in modem constitutional theory, and especially in the most re­
cent work, we then discuss several important theorists who 
exemplify the remaining, largely unreconstructed resistance to 
institutional analysis: Ronald Dworkin, Akhil Amar, and 
Lawrence Lessig. We mean to press claims that parallel our claims 
about statutory interpretation. First, at a minimum, accounts of 
constitutional interpretation are incomplete without reference to 
institutional capacities. Second, and more ambitiously, institutional 
considerations may enable constitutional lawyers to converge upon 
interpretive approaches, while bracketing first-best accounts of 
constitutionalism or simply remaining agnostic about them. 
Marbury v. Madison. Is judicial review desirable? Does the 
Constitution call for it? These are old and much-debated ques­
tions. Our modest goal here is to draw attention to a serious prob­
lem: many of the most well-known arguments on behalf of judicial 
review, including those in Marbury itself, are blind to institutional 
considerations. They ignore the risk of judicial error and the possi­
bility of dynamic consequences, In American law, Chief Justice 
John Marshall might even be deemed the father, or the founder, of 
the kind of institutional blindness that we are criticizing. 
Indeed, what is most striking about Marshall's arguments for 
judicial review is that they depend on a series of fragile textual and 
1 60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a revealing example of an analysis of judicial 
review that is not closely attuned to institutional variables, see Aharon Barak, 
Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 
HARV. L .  REV. 1 6  (2002). Barak urges, for example, that the "social consensus around 
fundamental views is usually what ought to guide judges, with regard to both the intro­
duction of new fundamental principles and the removal from the system of fundamental 
principles that have become discredited." Id. at 88. Barak continues that in some cases, 
"the judge carries out his role properly by ignoring the prevailing consensus and be­
coming the flagbearer of a new social consensus." Id. Now Barak is an extraordinary 
distinguished judge, and his remarks on the judicial role are highly illuminating. But he 
does not deal in any depth with the risk that judges will mistake the "social consensus 
around fundamental views" or with the danger that a judge will make factual and moral 
errors when "becoming the flagbearer of a new social consensus." American history is 
replete with both risks. We emphasize that we are not necessarily disagreeing with 
Barak's conclusions about the appropriate judicial role, for Israel or for anywhere else. 
But we doubt that there is any single "role of a supreme court in a democracy," simply 
because the relevant institutional variables will vary from place to place. 
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structural inferences, ignoring the institutional issues at stake. 
Much of Marshall's emphasis is on the unobjectionable claim that 
the Constitution is "superior, paramount law";161 but it is possible 
to accept that claim without also thinking that courts are author­
ized to strike down statutes that violate that law. A constitution is 
"superior, paramount law" in many legal systems that offer little or 
no judicial review of legislation. When Marshall famously asserts 
that "[i)t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de­
partment to say what the law is,"162 he is offering a conclusion, not 
an argument on its behalf. Marshall invokes the Supremacy 
Clause,163 which certainly means that a law repugnant to the 
Constitution must yield; but that clause offers nothing in support 
of the institutional claim that courts have the power to strike down 
laws that, in their judgment, are unconstitutional. Marshall's tex­
tual and structural inferences are very weak, and no source of con­
stitutional meaning clearly settles the question. Any evaluation of 
Marshall's conclusion must depend, in large part, on institutional 
considerations. 
If it appears odd to suggest that judicial review need not be a 
part of the American constitutional fabric, a reading of the histori­
cal materials should dispel the appearance. 164 Larry Kramer urges 
that, for the framers, the "Constitution was not ordinary law, not 
peculiarly the stuff of courts and judges."165 Instead, it was "a spe­
cial form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their 
governors."166 For many members of the revolutionary generation, 
constitutional principles were subject to "popular enforcement,"167 
that is, public insistence on compliance with the Constitution 
rather than judicial activity. "It was the legislature's delegated re­
sponsibility to decide whether a proposed law was constitutionally 
authorized, subject to oversight by the people. Courts simply had 
nothing to do with it, and they were acting as interlopers if they 
tried to second-guess the legislature's decision."168 Kramer traces 
161 . Marbury, 5 U.S. at 1 77. 
1 62. Id. 
1 63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("Laws of the United States" made "in Pursuance [of 
the Constitution) . . .  shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). 
1 64. See, e.g. , Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We 
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001 ). 
165. Id. at 10. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 40. 
168. Id. at 49. 
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the controversial early growth of the practice of judicial review, 
with many seeing it as an "act of resistance."169 At the Founding, a 
handful of participants saw a role for judicial review, though few of 
these imagined it as a powerful or important device, and none 
seemed anxious to emphasize it. Others were opposed . . . .  The vast 
majority of participants were still thinking in terms of popular consti­
tutionalisrn and so focused on traditional political means of enforcing 
the new charter; the notion of judicial review simply never crossed 
their rninds.170 
In Kramer's account, constitutional limits would be enforced 
not through courts, but as a result of republican institutions and 
the citizenry's own commitment to its founding document. Kramer 
raises serious doubts about the understanding in Marbury v. 
Madison and in particular about judicial supremacy in the inter­
pretation of the Constitution. He suggests that for some of the 
Framers, judicial review was "a substitute for popular resistance" 
and to be used "only when the unconstitutionality of a law was 
clear beyond dispute."171 What is important for our purposes is the 
idea that at the Founding, the supremacy of the Constitution was 
clear, but judicial enforcement was not, in part because of am­
bivalence about which institutions would be well-suited to ensur­
ing compliance. 
Of course, judicial review is, at present, constitutionally re­
spectable to say the least; we do not mean to argue against it here. 
But it is easy to imagine constitutional systems that would refuse 
to give judges the power to strike down legislation. If judges are 
corrupt, biased, poorly informed, or otherwise unreliable, it would 
hardly make sense to entrust them with that power. And if legisla­
tive officials could be trusted to be faithful to constitutional com­
mands, the need for judicial review would be greatly diminished. 
Or suppose that a constitutional system feared, with reason, that 
the power of judicial review would weaken the attention paid by 
other institutions to constitutional requirements - so that judicial 
review, it was. thought, would weaken the grip of constitutional 
limitations on other branches. This conjecture, empirical in charac­
ter, has been made in the United States172 as elsewhere. If judicial 
review, or aggressive judicial review, makes it less likely that other 
branches will follow the Constitution, perhaps judicial review 
should be weakened or exercised less frequently, with invocation 
of justiciability doctrines to limit the judicial role. A system of this 
169. Id. at 54. 
1 70. Id. at 67. 
171. Id. at 74. 
172. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901 ). 
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kind might be accepted by people who believe emphatically in 
constitutionalism, but who think that judicial review will tend to 
undermine rather than to promote its goals. Hence the analysis of 
the Marbury question itself must depend, in part, on the same con­
siderations that we have been stressing throughout. 
It is possible to draw a general conclusion. In many domains, 
the question is posed whether one institution should review the 
acts of another, and if so, the intensity with which that review 
should occur. This question arises, for example, in the context of 
constitutional challenges; attacks on criminal convictions; review 
of punitive damage awards by juries; appellate review of trial court 
findings; and judicial review of agency decisions of law, fact, and 
policy. In all of these areas, it is important to pay close attention to 
institutional variables. The costs of error and the costs of decision 
are crucial. It is necessary to examine dynamic effects. There is no 
sensible acontextual position on the question whether review, of 
one institution or another, should be intense or deferential, or 
indeed available at all. 
Modern constitutional theory. We do not mean to claim that 
Marbury's institutional blindness fairly represents all of subse­
quent constitutional theory in America. Many important strands of 
post-Marbury theory have been grounded in accounts of institu­
tional capacities. Most familiar is Thayer's idea that the 
Constitution might properly be treated, or interpreted, in one way 
by a legislature and another way by a court, in light of the distinc­
tive characteristics of the interpreting institution.173 Among the 
modern refinements of this idea are Alexander Bickel's legal 
process account of the distinctive attributes of courts as constitu­
tional interpreters, although that account glorified courts' insula­
tion ("the ways of the scholar")174 while overlooking the informa­
tional deficits that insulation produces;175 and Lawrence Sager's 
idea that legislatures might properly be charged with responsibility 
for underenforced constitutional norms.176 In general, it is unsur­
prising that a body of theory pervasively structured around the 
countermajoritarian difficulty should display some sensitivity to 
institutional role, if only in the stylized abstract manner of the 
legal process tradition. In this light, it is perhaps most accurate to 
173. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
174. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 {2d ed. 
1986). 
175. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 55-56 ( 1977). 
176. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constiflltional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
February 2003] Interpretation and Institutions 
say that constitutional theory has always taken some account of 
the institutional determinants of interpretation. 
Indeed, new contributions, of the 1990s and after, have 
displayed an increasingly sophisticated treatment of institutional 
attributes and capacities. First, lawyer-economists like Neil 
Komesar and Einer Elhauge drew upon transaction-cost econom­
ics177 and interest-group theory178 to refute simple arguments for an 
aggressive judicial posture in constitutional cases - what Komesar 
calls "single-institutional" arguments - that fail to compare all 
relevant costs and benefits of the available institutional alterna­
tives.179 Consider the standard line that judges should intervene to 
correct failures in political markets. Formulated in a traditional le­
gal process vocabulary by John Hart Ely,180 this view was trans­
lated into the vocabulary of public choice by libertarians and free­
marketeers in the 1980s. Komesar and Elhauge, however, make 
clear that process failures in the form of rent-seeking activity and 
differential interest-group access afflict the · courts as well 
(Elhauge), and that whatever relative insulation judges enjoy 
comes at the price of severe informational deficits (Komesar), so 
that the judges are prone to stumble into empirical pitfalls. The 
premise of comparative judicial advantage underlying the standard 
line, then, is at best questionable, and defending that line has 
become far more complicated business.181 
A second, currently influential strand in recent constitutional 
theory might be called neo-Thayerian; it is represented by Jeremy 
Waldron, Mark Tushnet, and Larry Kramer, among others. 
Waldron has examined how legislative institutions help to resolve 
otherwise intractable political disagreements;182 Tushnet has re­
vived and enriched the Thayerian concern with the debilitating ef­
fects of judicial guardianship on legislative performance;183 and 
Kramer, as we have seen, has worked to dispel overheated claims 
on behalf of ambitious, interventionist judicial review, especially 
177. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, I MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
1 78. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991). 
179. KOMESAR, supra note 177, at 6. 
180. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
181.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism 
After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 221-22 (1997) (responding to Elhauge and 
Komesar). 
182. See JEREMY w ALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
183. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWA y FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
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by impeaching its historical pedigree.184 In general, the stylized ab­
stractions about legislative and judicial capacities familiar to legal 
process have been improved by successive doses of realism and 
analytic sophistication, especially by the neo-Thayerians on the 
legislative side and by the lawyer-economists on the judicial side 
- although both camps have enriched our understanding across 
the whole institutional system, as is fitting for approaches that em­
phasize comparative institutional analysis and the avoidance of 
nirvana fallacies. 
These strands of recent constitutional theory might be de­
scribed as involving institutional competence writ large; their focus 
is on the large-scale allocation of responsibility, for policymaking 
and lawmaking, between or among the courts and political 
branches. To these salutary developments we wish to. add consid­
erations of institutional competence writ small. To the extent that 
interpretive authority over certain questions has been allocated to 
the courts by some background theory of comparative compe­
tence, there remains the question what interpretive rules courts 
should use in constitutional cases. We will claim that important 
strands of constitutional theory still attempt to answer ' this last 
question in an institutional vacuum. The essential defect in these 
accounts is that they are insufficiently sensitive to the identity and 
capacities of the interpreter; they treat the interpreter, explicitly or 
implicitly, as a theorist much like the constitutional theorist him­
self, rather than a judicial bureaucrat deciding cases under con­
straints of time, information, and expertise. We will consider three 
examples: the interpretive accounts of Ronald Dworkin, Akhil 
Amar, and Lawrence Lessig. In important respects these theorists 
perpetuate, even amplify, the flaws in Marbury's logic. 
Dworkin (redux), and a philosophical brief Dworkin's ap­
proach to constitutional law is nicely illuminated by an unusual 
brief submitted to the Supreme Court in the assisted suicide cases, 
a document widely known as "The Philosophers' Brief."185 The 
brief bears Dworkin's distinctive mark, and indeed Dworkin is 
listed as lead counsel. The Philosophers' Brief offers an ambitious 
argument, one with considerable appeal. It says that some "deeply 
personal decisions pose controversial questions about how and 
why human life has value. In a free society, individuals must be 
allowed to make those decisions for themselves, out of their own 
faith, conscience, and convictions."186 The brief urges that distinc-
1 84. See Kramer, supra note 164. 
1 85. See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief, N.Y. 
REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41 -42. 
1 86. Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, 
Tho.mas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thompson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
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tions between "omissions"(failing to provide continued treatment) 
and "acts"187 (providing drugs that will produce death) are "based 
on a misunderstanding of the pertinent moral principles."188 
Drawing on the abortion cases, the brief says that every person 
"has a right to make the 'most intimate and personal decisions cen­
tral to personal dignity and autonomy,' " a right that encompasses 
"some control over the time and manner of one's death."189 The 
brief thus urges the Court to declare a constitutional right to 
physician-assisted suicide. Dworkin's personal gloss on the brief 
says that it "defines a very general moral and constitutional princi­
ple - that every competent person has the right to make momen­
tous personal decisions, which invoke fundamental religious or 
philosophical convictions about life's value for himself."190 
· Simply as a matter of political morality, the argument in the 
Philosopher's Brief is certainly reasonable and it cannot easily be 
shown to be wrong. But suppose that the Court was convinced by 
the argument in principle; should the Court have held that there is 
a right to physician-assisted suicide? This is not so clear. Before 
accepting the argument, it is necessary to ask about judicial com­
petence to evaluate moral arguments of this sort, and also to ask 
about facts and incentives. Perhaps the Court is not especially 
well-equipped to evaluate those arguments; and if consequences 
matter, the moral arguments might not be decisive in light of the 
risk that any right to physician-assisted suicide would, in practice, 
undermine rather than promote the autonomy of patients.191 
Many people, including Dworkin himself, appear to think that 
the Supreme Court should not much hesitate to find a constitu­
tional right of some kind if it is presented with convincing (to the 
judges) philosophical arguments for that right, at least if the right 
"fits" with the rest of the legal fabric. For those who take an insti­
tutional perspective, this view is wrong. Courts may not under­
stand what justice requires, or may not be good at producing 
justice even when they understand it. In these circumstances, their 
understanding of the Constitution is partly a product of their 
j udgments about their own distinctive role as a social institution. 
Note that this claim does not depend on skepticism about moral or 
dents at 5, Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 1 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), and Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 ( 1997) (No. 95-1858). 
1 87. Id. at 10-11 (distinguishing between �cts and omissions in the assisted-suicide 
context). 
188. lei. at I 1 .  
1 89. Id. a t  20. 
190. Dworkin et al., supra note 185, at 41. 
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1 123 (1997) (exploring 
this possibility). 
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political arguments. It is reasonable to believe that judges are not 
well-equipped to engage in theoretically ambitious tasks, without 
also believing that political theory is itself problematic or useless. 
Amar. Akhil Amar provides a valuable discussion of a method 
he labels "intratextualism."192 The term denotes a textualism that 
makes extensive use of comparisons across clauses - a technique 
capable of generating dramatic readings, such as the claim that the 
key to understanding the meaning of "speech" in the First 
Amendment is the meaning of "speech" in the Speech and Debate 
Clause.193 Amar's target is what he calls "clause-bound" interpreta­
tion, the judicial practice of reading constitutional provisions and 
their accompanying history and precedent in (partial) isolation 
from textually related provisions. 
In its emphasis on the authority of constitutional text, and in its 
populist underpinnings, Amar's account appears to lie at some 
polar opposite from Dworkin's, in which the constitutional text 
does relatively little work and populism is hardly a defining ideal. 
Yet for our purposes the two accounts overlap. What Dworkin and 
Amar share is a deep interest in a sort of constitutional holism: a 
commitment to attempting, if fairly possible, to read the 
Constitution (whether that is taken to denote the document's text 
or the moral principles underlying constitutional law) as a coher­
ent, integrated whole. It is this shared feature of holism or coher­
entism that unites our critique · of Dworkin with our critique of 
Amar. To his credit, Amar is not oblivious to the problem, but we 
think he devotes insufficient attention to the possibility that real­
world judges charged with holistic interpretation will simply blun­
der, producing a pattern of incoherent outcomes, or, worse yet, 
producing an internally coherent but morally misguided vision of 
public law.194 
Amar recommends intratextualism as tool suitable to the 
courtroom as well as the classroom; indeed most of Amar's 
intratextualist heroes are famous judges, especially John Marshall. 
Yet despite noting judicial blunders, Amar does not give sustained 
attention to the institutional capacities of the real-world judges 
who would be charged with practicing intratextualism; he does not 
offer a careful treatment of judges' interpretive capacities or their 
likely performance under the alterna�ive regimes of intratextual­
ism, on one hand, and clause-bound interpretation, on the other. 
192. See Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextua/ism, 1 1 2  HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
1.93. Id. at 815-16. 
194. See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young,_ Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The 
Trouble with lntratextualism, 1 1 3  HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000). For Amar's recognition of 
the problem, see Amar, supra note 1 92, at 775-78 (suggesting blundering uses of 
intratextualism); id. at 799-802 (discussing weakness of the method). 
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Compared to the clause-bound alternative, intratextualism re­
quires a more complicated and information-intensive inquiry, one 
that will reduce decisional accuracy whenever judges read the 
comparison texts mistakenly. So, for example, a judge who looks 
to the Speech and Debate Clause to illuminate the Free Speech 
Clause might go badly wrong, given that the former provision 
predates the First Amendment and addresses very different 
problems. In the abstract, there is no reason to think that the 
illuminating effect of intratexualism will predominate over its 
error-producing effect. 
What's worse, intratextualism in the hands of fallible judges 
risks producing a holistic, highly coherent, but fundamentally 
mistaken analysis, one that constitutionalizes a simultaneous 
misreading of a whole set of related provisions. Justice Douglas's 
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,195 for example, offered a holis­
tic, coherent account of the Bill of Rights as based upon a general 
principle of privacy; and it is an account that Amar himself thinks 
is deeply mistaken.196 Those with a realistic view of judges' abilities 
as constitutional interpreters might prefer the limited incoherence 
of clause-bound interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erro­
neous universal account. 
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A djustments. Similar problems beset Lawrence Lessig's valuable 
account of constitutional interpretation, which sees that practice as 
an exercise in "translation."197 Translation is a particular version of 
originalism, of "fidelity" to the Constitution of the founding era. 198 
Lessig's important insight is that judges might, in principle, act 
more faithfully to the original Constitution by updating constitu­
tional rules to meet changed circumstances than by adhering 
woodenly to the specific text chosen by the founding generation, 
or to their specific expectations. Just as a translator might do bet­
ter to choose a colloquial analog that captures the flavor of the 
original, rather than simply using a literal equivalent, so too the 
original meaning of the constitutional structure might, in changed , 
circumstances, best be preserved by departures from the original 
understanding. In the area of federalism, for example, Lessig urges 
the Court to "make up" constitutional rules that restore the origi-
195. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
196. Amar, supra note 192, at 797 & n.196. In Amar's view, the key to a coherentist 
reading of the Bill of Rights is constitutional populism, not libertarian privacy. See gen­
erally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE B ILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(1998). 
197. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1 171 n.32 
(1 993). 
1 98. See id. at 1 169-73. 
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nal balance between federal and state authority.199 " [T]o be faithful 
to the constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be 
unfaithful to the constitutional text."200 
Translation is, without doubt, a useful contribution to first-best 
theorizing about constitutional interpretation. No other such 
account has, in recent years, generated as much comment and as 
many engaging applications.201 Translation is best viewed as a 
refinement of purposivism: like Hart and Sacks's approach,202 
translation boosts the level of interpretive generality from the spe­
cific intentions or expectations of a law's framers to their ultimate 
aims or ends. But Lessig's account also shares purposivism's insen­
sitivity to institutional considerations. Lessig fails to consider the 
possibility that judges might be poor translators, garbling meanings 
so badly that a simple-minded transliteration would preserve more 
of the original than would an ambitious and mistaken attempt to 
capture the original's real sense. Judicial mistakes might make 
ambitious attempts at translation self-defeating, driving results fur­
ther away from the original meaning rather than pushing results 
closer to it. In the federalism setting, for example, it is by no means 
obvious that making up rules to approximate the original balance 
is, even on Lessig's theoretical premises, the right prescription for 
the Court. The Court might overshoot the mark by announcing 
stringent restrictions on federal authority that push constitutional 
law further from the founding balance than would deference to 
national political processes.203 
Here is another example, taken not from Lessig's own work 
but from the secondary literature applying Lessig's insights. Sup­
pose that the original Constitution, rightly understood, bars dele­
gations of legislative authority to the executive, and also bars the 
legislative veto. (Of course we do not mean to endorse or oppose 
either claim here). The circumstances of modern government are 
such, however, that delegations of legislative authority are perva­
sive, and there is no prospect of returning to the original under-
1 99. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez. 1995 SUP. 
Cf. REV. 125, 192. 
200. Id. at 193. 
201. See, e.g. , Symposium, Fidelity in Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 
(1997). 
202. HART & SACKS, supra note 1 4. 
203. This was one of the themes of Justice Souter's dissent in United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 ( 1995). which argued, among other things, that deference to ra­
tional congressional judgments about the scope of the interstate commerce power bet­
ter captured the original understanding. See id. , 514 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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standing in this regard.204 The translation theorist might argue that 
judges should vote to uphold the legislative veto, even though it is 
clearly unconstitutional in isolation, on the ground that it is a 
"compensating adjustment"205 needed to restore the original struc­
tural balance among the branches of government.206 The legislative 
veto will, on this view, allow the legislature to limit and police the 
sweeping delegations of authority that it cannot avoid making. In 
fact, Justice White's dissent in the decision that invalidated the 
legislative veto urged upholding the veto on just this ground.207 
Of course there is a competing account. Perhaps the legislative 
veto falls afoul of the translated Constitution, because it aggra­
vates the power of self-interested private groups over processes of 
lawmaking, thus defeating the goal of bicameralism and present­
ment, which is (on this view) to reduce the role of factions in gov­
ernment. On this view, for the Court to uphold the legislative veto 
might move public law farther away from, rather than closer to, 
the structure and purposes of the original Constitution. Now this 
view may be wrong. The problem is that it is no simple task to 
identify the commitments of the Constitution that are to be trans­
lated to fit with modern circumstances. As with purposes, so with 
commitments: There is no simple task of discovery here. 
We are confident that Lessig would not disagree with this 
claim. But from the institutional perspective, the idea that judges 
should translate original structures by searching for offsetting 
constitutional adjustments is defective if unaccompanied by an 
account of judicial capacities. It takes great confidence in those 
capacities to think that judges can identify the net effects of such 
large-scale reforms with enough precision to warrant jettisoning 
clear constitutional provisions and settled constitutional rules. The 
overall effect of the legislative veto, or of its invalidation, is a 
major research question for experts in political science.208 There is 
little reason to believe that generalist judges, devoting a brief time 
to the subject and possessed of limited information, can form even 
a plausible view of the relevant complexities. Judicial competence 
is not the only problem with the idea of translation through com­
pensating adjustments; there are serious conceptual puzzles as 
204. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the 
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). 
205. Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 1 1 1  YALE LJ. 
1311 ,  1367 (2001). 
206. McCutchen, supra note 204, at 37-38. 
207. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 994-95 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
208. See, e.g., JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 4-5 (1996). 
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well.2w But for our purposes the important objection is that trans­
lation assumes an optimistic account of the judges' abilities as 
translators, an account that becomes increasingly questionable as 
judicial departures from text and original expectations become in­
creasingly ambitious, and as the systemic effects of the adjustment 
become increasingly difficult for generalist judges to predict. 
Some generalizations. We can generalize these points about 
Dworkin, Amar, and Lessig in two ways; both are familiar from 
the earlier institutional account of �tatutory interpretation. The 
first point is that a master principle of constitutional authority -
law as integrity (Dworkin), or the primacy of constitutional text 
(Amar), or fidelity through translation (Lessig) - taken by itself, 
can yield no conclusions at all about proper interpretive method. 
With a certain assessment of judicial capacities, judges might do 
better, by Amar's own lights, with clause-bound interpretation 
than with intratextualism. On Lessig's own premises, fallible 
judges might be better translators if they stick to the unambitious 
transliteration that Lessig disparages. As for Dworkin, consider 
the possibility that a fallible judge charged with implementing 
law-as-integrity might do better, from the moral point of view, by 
opting for a relatively mechanical adherence to prior rulings, 
described at a low level of generality, than by ambitiously 
attempting to bring principled coherence to large areas of law. 
Thus an epistemically humble Dworkinian judge might look a 
great deal like the incremental, common law constitutional jurist, 
who defers to precedent on the basis of a Burkean appreciation of 
the limits of individuals' cognitive capacities.210 
The second, larger point is the possibility of incompletely theo­
rized agreements about interpretive method in constitutional 
cases. Interpreters who hold various first-order accounts of consti­
tutional authority might, for example, converge on a practice of 
clause-bound precedent. The Amarian would do so to avoid large­
scale, coherent mistakes by fallible intratextualist judges; the 
Dworkinian would do so because any more ambitious attempt at 
justificatory ascent might predictably do worse, on Dworkin's own 
criteria of moral integrity, in the hands of judges who do not 
resemble Hercules, Dworkin's idealized judge. Where agreements 
209. Levinson observes that identifying a compensating adjustment depends upon 
highly contestable judgments about the framing of constitutional problems: Why ex­
actly should the constitutionality of the legislative veto be assessed in relation to the 
nondelegation doctrine, rather than in isolation? Levinson, supra note 205, at 1 367-68. 
We add that a critical factor, among others, in deciding upon the proper scope of the 
transactional frame is the capacity of judges to manage the increased complexity of 
larger frames. 
210. This is the picture drawn in David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 ( 1 996). 
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of this sort are possible, the underlying disagreements between 
competing accounts of the Constitution's authority could be 
bracketed or ignored; with respect at least to the role of precedent, 
it would be possible to choose an approach to interpretation 
without committing to any such first-best position. 
To be sure, any of these stories might or might not be plausible; 
the empirical agenda we mean to sketch would consist of investiga­
tions along these and similar lines. The important point is just that 
constitutional interpretation is not the same in a second-best world 
as in a first-best world. As with statutes, so with the ·constitution: 
any account of constitutional interpretation that overlooks the de­
cisive role of institutional considerations is for that reason defec­
tive. 
A note on tradition in constitutional law. These ideas very much 
bear on the continuing debate about the proper role of tradition in 
constitutional law. Justice Scalia, among others, has urged that in 
the face of textual ambiguity, judges should follow traditions de­
scribed at a low-level of generality. They should not strike down 
legislation unless it contravenes actual practices as vindicated by 
history.21 1  "We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant 
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right 
can be identified."212 It would be possible to defend this approach 
on Burkean grounds, with the claim that long-standing practices 
are likely to be justified, or good, by virtue of their historical 
pedigree. And for those who dislike Burke, it would be possible to 
respond that long-standing practices might reflect power or arbi­
trariness, and hence that tradition is a bad source of constitutional 
law and (in particular) of constitutional rights.213 Much of the de­
bate over tradition has been cast in these terms. 
With an institutional focus, the debate looks very different. 
Perhaps traditionalism is best defended on the ground that judges 
are highly fallible human beings, and that if they are unmoored 
from either text or traditions, they might well make mistakes.214 In 
fact, we could imagine a society, different but not unrecognizably 
from our own, in which this defense of traditionalism would be 
convincing to a diverse group of people. Suppose, for example, 
that political processes functioned extremely well, in the sense that 
unjust or ill-considered outcomes were highly unlikely, and were 
corrected politically when they occurred. Suppose too that in such 
211 .  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 1 10, 122-23 (1989). 
212. Id. at 127 n.6. 
2 13. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST 62 (1980). 
214. Justice Scalia suggests a similar point: "Because [general] traditions provide 
such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's 
views." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. 
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a nation, judges were likely to make big blunders, in the form of 
decisions that were confused or even invidious, and very hard to 
correct once made. In such a society, tradition might well be the 
best foundation of constitutional rights where text is unclear. 
Perhaps other bright-line rules - such as a strong presumption in 
favor of upholding enacted law - would be better still. The point 
is that an evaluation of traditionalism, as of any other interpretive 
method, is partly empirical, and based on an assessment of how 
different institutions are likely to perform under the various alter­
natives. Without some empirical projections, it is hard to venture 
sensible answers. 
D. The Common Law 
Our emphasis has been on the interpretation of texts, taken as 
the sorts of commands found in constitutions, statutes, and regula­
tions. But precedents are of course texts too, and in deciding what 
a precedent means, a common law court should pay close attention 
to institutional considerations. This point is often well-understood 
in the common law context, especially in the academic literature 
on contract interpretation,215 but not always, for academics often 
evaluate common law decisions simply by asking whether the ex­
isting cases can be unified by an attractive conceptual principle. 
That is not the question courts should ask; at least it is not the only 
question. When common law judges, as opposed to theorists of the 
common law, decide whether to characterize precedents narrowly 
or broadly, the questions of judicial fallibility and of dynamic ef­
fects are central. 
Consider two currently disputed issues frequently faced by 
common law courts: whether to expand employee protection 
against at-will discharge216 and whether to discipline punitive 
damage awards by juries.217 It would be possible to analyze prece­
dents in a style akin to Dworkin's, asking what principle puts them 
in the most attractive light. Under this approach, some people 
would undoubtedly conclude that courts should limit the power of 
employers to discharge employees, eventually creating, perhaps, a 
215. The possibility of formalism in the operational. rule-based sense, justified on 
the basis of claims about judicial competence and ex ante effects, has recently com­
manded a great deal of interest in the literature on contract interpretation. See, e.g. , 
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational 
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847 (2000). 
2 16. For a helpful overview of this issue, see MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 680-99 (2d ed. 1999). 
217. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, cert. granted, 70 
U.S.L.W. 3580, (U.S. June 3, 2002) (No. 01 -1289). 
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right to be fired only on job-related grounds. And other people 
would undoubtedly erect barriers to apparently unreasonable 
punitive damage awards, expanding judicial power of remittitur to 
ensure, for example, a sensible relationship between the compen­
satory award and the punitive award. 
It should be clear that any effort to proceed in this way should 
pay close attention to two problems. First, judges might not know 
what they are doing. In the labor market, for example, some 
observers suggest that arbitrary discharges are actually rare,218 and 
that a right to be discharged only for job-related reasons would not 
really protect deserving employees, but increase meritless Jitiga­
tion, with employees being the victims (through reduced wages or 
employment). Any significant shift in the common law could have 
large systemic effects on the employment market, and courts are 
not in a good position to anticipate those effects. With respect to 
punitive damages, it is not so clear that there should be a sensible 
relationship, all of the time, between the compensatory award and 
the punitive award. If, for example, the injury is very hard to de­
tect in most cases, the standard economic approach calls for a large 
multiplier. In any case, state legislators have been very much in­
volved in the process of considering relevant reforms. There has 
been active debate in many states about the permissible grounds 
for discharge, and even more active debate about cabining large 
punitive damage awards. Perhaps judicial decisions, attractive in 
principle, would dampen those debates. Perhaps cautious and in­
cremental judgments, less attractive in principle, would represent a 
form of deference to ongoing processes that are more likely to 
settle the relevant areas well. 
Here, as elsewhere, we do not mean to reach a final judgment 
on the issues in question. And by drawing attention to institutional 
considerations in the common law setting, we hope that we are not 
saying anything surprising or novel. Too often, however, the insti­
tutional considerations are placed in the background and the in­
terpretation of precedents is undertaken in a way that is indiffer­
ent to them. 
E. Rules, Standards, and the Institutional Lens 
An emphasis on institutional considerations also bears on the 
current debate over whether judges should attempt to decide on a 
case-by-case basis or instead offer guidance through general rules. 
In ruling on same-sex education, punitive damages, affirmative ac­
tion, anti-loitering legislation, and more, should judges limit their 
218. See, e.g. , Richard Epstein, ln Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 947, 970 (1984). 
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decisions to the particular facts, or clarify the governing principles 
for a wide range of cases? In his famous treatment of legal rea­
soning, Edward Levi embraced "reasoning by example," in which 
judicial decisions would be limited to the facts of the case at 
hand.219 Enthusiasm for case-specific decisions can be found in 
the work of some of the current justices, most notably Justice 
O'Connor.220 But Justice Scalia, among others, has urged that the 
interests in predictability and equal treatment argue in favor of 
wide rulings that promise to bring order to the law.221 
Our approach here suggests that it is impossible to resolve this 
dispute in the abstract. When predictability is especially important, 
and where numerous decisions have to be made, the case for rule­
bound judgment is greatly strengthened.222 And when judges have 
the information and the capacity to produce decent rules, they 
have good reason to attempt to do exactly that. But if judges lack 
that information and that capacity, they might reasonably limit 
their decisions to particular facts for fear that broad decisions will 
have unfortunate systematic effects and prove too crude to handle 
situations not yet subject to briefing and argument.223 These points 
suggest that the argument for case-specific decisions is much 
stronger for district courts than for the Supreme Court, which has 
the responsibility for overseeing the development of federal law, 
and which can cause great confusion by case-specific rulings. But it 
also seems clear that in its initial encounters with complex areas, 
the Court does well to avoid rules, at least if it lacks confidence in 
its capacity to produce good rules and if the interest in predictabil­
ity is not so insistent in the particular case. An emphasis on dy­
namic effects, and on institutional capacities, can therefore help to 
explain what is at stake in one of the most vigorous current de­
bates within the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that issues of legal interpretation cannot be 
adequately resolved without attention to institutional questions. 
219. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-6 ( 1949). 
220. See, e.g. , 44 Liquornmrt v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 530-32 (1 995) 
(O'Connor, J ., concurring). 
221. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1 1 75 ( 1989). 
222. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557. 564 ( 1 992). 
223. For a discussion of some of the benefits and risks of broad rulings, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME : JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
57-59 {1999). 
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An extraordinary variety of distinguished people have explored 
interpretive strategies without attending to the fact that such 
strategies will inevitably be used by fallible people and with likely 
dynamic effects extending far beyond the case at hand. Two 
mechanisms seem principally responsible for this institutional 
blindness. One is a role-related trap: interpretive theorists ask 
themselves "how would I decide the case, if I were a judge?" - a 
question whose very form suppresses the key consideration that 
the relevant interpretive rules are to be used by judges rather than 
theorists. Another is a cognitive trap: specialists, such as legal aca­
demics, criticize the insufficiently nuanced opinions issued by gen­
eralist judges in particular cases, overlooking the possibility that 
the same judges might weJJ have done far worse, over a series of 
cases, by attempting to emulate the specialists' approach. Overall, 
the key question seems to be, "how would perfect judges decide 
cases?" rather than "how should fallible judges proceed, in light of 
their fallibility and their place in a complex system of private and 
public ordering?" 
Our minimal submission has been that answers to the former 
question are hopelessly inadequate. We have argued as well that in 
some cases, an appreciation of judicial fallibility and of dynamic 
effects will enable people to converge on an appropriate approach 
despite their disagreements about the right path for perfect judges 
to follow. At the very least, an appreciation of institutional ques­
tions should make it possible for people to have a better apprecia­
tion of what they are disagreeing about, and also of strategies for 
making some progress in the future. We have emphasized the im­
portance of asking about the likelihood of legislative oversight and 
correction; the values of planning and predictability, and the ef­
fects on these values of one or another interpretive choice in the 
particular context; and the actual performance of courts that fol­
low textualism, purposivism, or some other approach. Here there 
is much room for empirical work ·involving, for example, the 
nature and effects of different interpretive approaches within 
different states, the responsiveness of state legislatures to those 
different approaches, and the possible connection between for­
mality in interpretation and legislative attentiveness in various 
domains of law. 
If we evaluate interpretive issues in institutional terms, we will 
not necessarily adopt any particular approach to interpretation. 
But we have suggested that once the question is properly framed, 
it becomes easy to see why reasonable people might favor a for­
malist approach to statutes in some or many contexts, not on the 
basis of indefensible ideas about how words work, but on simple 
institutional grounds. On this view, formalism might be accepted, 
not because the Constitution requires it (it doesn't), and not be-
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cause formalism is required by a proper understanding of the con­
cept of law (it isn't), but when and because formalism is the best 
path for generalist judges who are often ill-equipped to resolve the 
policy issues at stake. For the same reasons, we have indicated 
some enthusiasm for the emerging view that administrative agen­
cies ought to be allowed a degree of flexibility in their own inter­
pretations, flexibility that goes well beyond that of courts. 
Agencies are in a better position to know whether a particular re­
sult, apparently compelled by text, really is senseless. They are also 
in a better position to know whether a departure from text will 
unsettle the regulatory scheme in a damaging way. If agencies 
ought not to be given this interpretive flexibility, it is also for insti­
tutional reasons - as, for example, in the claim that agencies are 
subject to the influence of powerful private groups, or in the sug­
gestion that Congress will provide sufficiently prompt corrections 
of regulatory decisions that, while faithful to statutory text, pro­
duce significant harm. Of course there are many empirical issues 
here. 
In many ways the question of constitutional law is harder, sim­
ply because people disagree so sharply about what constitutes a 
good outcome. Ironically, however, constitutional law has already 
witnessed a significant, if partial, institutional turn: many people 
emphasize that any approach to the Constitution must take 
account of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the judici­
ary. Even here, however, we have seen that influential voices in 
constitutional law argue in favor of interpretive strategies in a way 
that is inadequately attuned to the issue of institutional capacities. 
Those who emphasize philosophical arguments, or the idea of 
holistic or intratextual interpretations, seem to us to have given 
too little attention to institutional questions. Here, as elsewhere, 
our minimal submission is that a claim about appropriate interpre­
tation is incomplete if it does not pay attention to considerations of 
administrability, judicial capacities, and systemic effects in addition 
to the usual imposing claims about legitimacy and constitutional 
authority. But we have also suggested the possibility that in consti­
tutional law, an assessment of those issues might lead to conver­
gence, on appropriate methods, from those who disagree about 
what ideal judges should do. The New Deal period culminated in a 
convergence of this kind. In the current period, it is revealing that 
many people, from their diverse points of view, now seem de­
creasingly satisfied with the idea that judges should interpret am­
biguous constitutional provisions in a way that seems, to those 
judges, best on grounds of political morality. 
Our major goal here has not, however, been to argue on behalf 
of any particular approach to interpretation. Our ambition has 
been at once narrower and more critical - to show that interpre-
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tive theory, as elaborated by its most able practitioners, has been 
remarkably indifferent to institutional issues, proceeding as if 
judges are reliable and as if their choice of approach lacks systemic 
consequences. We think that this indifference is a kind of pathol­
ogy, produced, in large part, by the legal culture's continuing insis­
tence on framing the question of interpretation as, "What would 
you do, when faced with a problem of this sort?" We hope to have 
shown that this is a misleading question to ask, and one that has 
quite damaging consequences not only for the academic study of 
law, but for legal institutions as well. Once the question is properly 
reframed, it should be possible to see interpretive questions in a 
new and better light, and perhaps to adopt new and better answers 
as well. 
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